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INTRODUCTION

A foreclosure can often be a financial disaster.' Emotions run high.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. I wish to
express my sincere appreciation to Professor Jack Williams and Professor Steve Friedland,
each of whom provided invaluable help with their comments and encouragement while I was
developing this article. I also want to express my gratitude to the Georgia State University
College of Law for the research grants that enabled me to devote the time required for the
research and writing of this article.
1. In the majority of foreclosures, the sale price realized at the foreclosure sale is so
inadequate that the borrower loses not only her home, but also any equity she may have in
the property. An empirical study by Professor Steven Wechsler on foreclosure sales revealed
that eighty percent of the foreclosures that he reviewed resulted in a sales price that was less
than the amount of debt the property secured. Steven Wechsler, Through the Looking Glass:
Foreclosure by Sale as De Facto Strict Foreclosure-An Empirical Study of Mortgage
Foreclosureand Subsequent Resale, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 850, 871 (1985).
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Money,' property, and livelihoods are at stake. Yet, how the law
constructs foreclosure sales is as much a product of historical accident as
it is coherent thought.
Imagine, for the moment, the trials of Borrower X. Borrower X
borrowed $110,000 from Bank to purchase a home. She secured her
repayment obligation by granting a lien' on the property purchased.
Assume that when Borrower X purchased the property, the property was
worth $120,000. Further assume Borrower X paid down the balance of
her loan to $90,000 over several years4 before she defaulted. After
default, Bank provided the required minimum notice' and fully complied
with all other requirements6 of that jurisdiction's non-judicial foreclosure
process. Bank was the only bidder7 at the foreclosure sale and pur-

2. If the high bid at the foreclosure sale is less than the outstanding balance of the debt,
accrued interest, and expenses of foreclosure, a deficiency will result for which the borrower
remains personally liable absent some form of anti-deficiency legislation. In addition, a
foreclosure sale may result in tax ramifications and generate significant tax liability for the
foreclosed borrower. Discussion of the tax implications of a foreclosure is beyond the scope
of this article, but for a good general discussion see John Mixon & Ira B. Shepard, Anti-deficiency Relief for ForeclosedHomeowners: ULSIA Section 511(b), 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
455, 465-69 (1992).
3. This lien is typically referred to as a mortgage, but in some jurisdictions the lien may
take the form of a deed of trust lien or a deed to secure debt. There are distinctions between
the different types of liens, but those distinctions are irrelevant for the purposes of this article.
4. A $100,000 loan bearing interest at a fixed rate of eight percent and amortized over
30 years would require a monthly payment for principal and interest of approximately $807.40.
To reduce the loan balance to $90,000, the borrower would have been required to make about
167 months of payments, amounting to almost 14 years of debt service.
5. The required minimum notice for debt that has already been accelerated may be as
little as 21 days. See, e.g., TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002(b) (West 1995).
6. Beside providing the debtor with written notice of the sale, the jurisdiction's
requirements may demand no more than posting the written notice of sale at the courthouse
and filing a copy with the county clerk before selling the property at the courthouse steps. See
§ 51.002(b)(l)-(2).
7. Information is generally only available regarding the high bidder at the foreclosure
sale, and not with respect to other bidders that may have participated. In my experience,
however, it is not uncommon for the lender to be the only bidder. During the years that I
practiced law in Texas, I was personally involved in several hundred foreclosures on behalf of
clients and never observed a single bid by any party other than the lender. In an empirical
study of foreclosures conducted in one county in New York in 1979, the lender was found to
have been the purchaser at approximately 75% of those foreclosure sales. See Wechsler, supra
note 1, at 870; see also GRANT NELSON & DALE WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW
§ 8.8 (3d ed. 1994). Nelson & Whitman observed that "[f]requently, the mortgagee is not only
the foreclosure sale purchaser, but the only bidder attending the sale." Id. Nelson & Whitman
attribute this phenomenon to the mortgagee's ability to credit bid, other potential bidders lack
of notice, the difficulty in ascertaining the legal title the purchaser will receive, and the
difficulty of inspecting the premises prior to sale as possible explanations. Id.
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chased the property for a credit bid8 of $65,000. Two months later,
while Bank is in the midst of pursuing the $25,000 deficiency judgment
against Borrower X, the property acquired at the foreclosure sale is resold by the Bank for $120,000.2 Subsequently, Bank obtained and
pursued the $25,000 deficiency judgment against Borrower X. It appears
that Bank may have received more than it was entitled to because it
recovered not only more funds than the amount of the debt, but even
more funds than initially loaned.10 Although surprising and counter
intuitive, absent unlawful conduct such as collusion," Bank may keep
all the money.' 2 The obvious problem for Borrower X is her loss of
equity' in the property. The present foreclosure law paradigms are ill8. Since the lender is entitled to all of the proceeds of the foreclosure sale up to the
amount of its loan, the lender is generally allowed to "credit bid" by merely reducing the
borrower's indebtedness by an amount equal to the lender's bid. Thus, the creditor purchases
the property without bringing any new value to the relationship. The lender's ability to credit
bid has sometimes been criticized as providing the lender with an advantage over third-party
bidders.
Allowing the lender to credit bid to buy property from the defaulting borrower (with
whom the lender has previously "deposited" its money) could be analogized to allowing a
borrower to withdraw money from his savings account to pay for property purchased from the
lender where the savings account is maintained. One difficulty with the analogy, however, is
that the lender's "deposit" constitutes sunk costs. A lender that perceives little chance of
collecting a deficiency against its borrower may readily credit bid its entire debt, or a large
percentage thereof, without regard to the property's value. Over time this pattern may
theoretically discourage third parties from even attending foreclosure sales. It is unlikely,
however, that credit bidding is a significant factor in the breakdown of the current foreclosure
processes. See generallyNELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 7, § 8.8 (citing to Charles F. Curry
Co. v. Goodman, 737 P.2d 963 (Okla. Ct. App. 1987) (stating that in bidding at a foreclosure
sale of its own mortgage, mortgagee is not required to pay cash, but is entitled to give credit
up to the amount of its mortgage debt)).
9. A lender who has purchased property at a foreclosure sale is not required to account
to the borrower for profits from a subsequent resale. But see Wechsler, supra note 1, at 887
(arguing that "[t]here is no reason to distinguish between profits realized on a resale and a
surplus produced at a foreclosure sale," and suggesting foreclosure reform to require the
return of profit from resales to the borrower under some circumstances).
10. In exchange for the outstanding $90,000 balance of the initial $100,000 loan, Bank
will receive the $120,000 proceeds from the resale, and, if it can successfully collect the deficiency judgment, it will add $25,000 for a total of $145,000.
11. Collusion or other irregular conduct in connection with the foreclosure sale will
permit the foreclosure sale to be set aside. See generally NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note
7, § 7.21.
12. But see Central Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Spears, 425 So. 2d 403 (Miss. 1983) (holding that
lender was required to return to the borrower the amount it received above the foreclosure
sales price when the lender resold the property less than two weeks later).
13. The term "equity" refers to the value of the borrower's property above the
outstanding balance of the debt or debts secured by the property. Black's Law Dictionary
defines "equity" as the "remaining interest belonging to one who has pledged or mortgaged
his property, or the surplus of value which may remain after the property has been disposed
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equipped to address this legitimate borrower's concern.
Further imagine the exploits of Bank ABC. Three years ago Bank
ABC loaned to Borrower Z the sum of $95,000 in order to enable
Borrower Z to purchase his home for $100,000. Borrower Z defaulted
on his loan from Bank ABC after one year of payments and has not
made any payments for the past two years. Bank ABC has finally
obtained a judicial decree of foreclosure and the property is scheduled
to be sold at foreclosure. The balance of the indebtedness to Bank ABC
has increased several thousand dollars above the initial loan amount due14
to unpaid interest, unpaid tax and insurance bills, and legal costs
associated with the non-performing loan. The value of the property has
declined dramatically because of Borrower Z's lack of maintenance and
abuse over the last two years during the foreclosure litigation. In
essence, since the default, Borrower Z has occupied the property rentfree at the lender's expense. 5 The fair market value of Bank ABC's
collateral is far below the debt legitimately due Bank ABC and
Borrower Z is judgment proof. Present foreclosure law paradigms are
also ill-equipped to address this pressing concern of lenders.
As in the past, modern models of foreclosure attempt to accommodate both the borrower and the lender while also considering society's
interest. Borrowers have an important interest either in protecting their
property's equity or in reducing their post-sale liability exposure.
Lenders have an important interest in expediting their recovery on nonperforming loans, thereby reducing iheir losses and costs. Society,
including the borrowing public, has an interest in a fair and efficient
means of foreclosure, which theoretically reduces the costs of funds to
prospective borrowers, 16 preserves what equity is present for the benefit
of for the satisfaction of liens. The amount or value of a property above the total liens or
charges." BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 484 (5th ed. 1979). Lenders typically will loan only a
portion of the property's appraised value, and thus borrowers will generally have some degree
of equity in the property when the debt is incurred. Appreciation in the property's value and
debt service payments will generate additional equity in the property for the borrower.
14. Generally, whether costs associated with attorney's fees and collections of the
outstanding indebtedness are included in the entire outstanding indebtedness is a matter of
contract. Thus, if the loan documents permit the recovery of fees and costs, a lender may
collect reasonable attorney's fees and costs. These amounts are included in the outstanding
indebtedness.
15. Absent anti-deficiency legislation, this rent-free period would merely be a deferral
of payment inasmuch as the lender could recover it from the sales proceeds received at the
foreclosure or from the borrower personally via a deficiency judgment. However, for varying
reasons, lenders rarely pursue or collect on deficiencies. See Wechsler, supra note 1, at 878.
16. See Mark Meador, The Effects of Mortgagee Laws on Home Mortgage Rates, 34 J.
ECON. & BUS. 143 (1982) (concluding that borrower protection laws place upward pressure
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of the borrower, and minimizes the strategic use of foreclosure laws.
The present paradigms of foreclosure law fail in their efforts to
accomplish this accommodating task. In fact, some models promote
borrower fairness at the expense of efficiency, while some promote
efficiency at the expense of borrower fairness. It is as though legislatures
believe a jurisdiction cannot have it both ways.
The model of foreclosure constructed in this Article rejects the
present paradigms and embraces a functional approach to foreclosure
that truly accommodates the interests of the borrower, lender, and
society. The model proposed in this Article further rejects as a confining
force the notion that efficiency in foreclosure can only be achieved at the
expense of fairness and vice versa.
Courts and legislatures have constantly struggled to regulate the
proper balance of power between lenders and borrowers. 7 This
struggle, which began with the origination of foreclosure sales in
medieval England," continues today. Courts and legislatures have
operated on the premise that if they could strike the proper balance,
then property sold at a foreclosure sale would generate proceeds in the
approximate amount of the property's value. These proceeds would then
be distributed to repay the lender, with any surplus going to the
borrower.
Despite past legislative and judicial reforms of the foreclosure
process, the goal of striking the proper balance remains elusive.19
Historical efforts to regulate the balance of power between lender and
borrower imply, and indeed generally result in, one side gaining at the
other's expense. To date, foreclosure law is perceived as a zero-sum
game. Furthermore, attempts to regulate the bid amount,2' to prohibit
on the interest rate charged by lenders). But see Michael H. Schill, An Economic Analysis of
Mortgage Protection Laws, 77 VA. L. REV. 489 (1991) (concluding that it is unlikely that
mortgagor protection laws substantially increase the costs of home credit).
17. See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 114 S. Ct. 1757,1763 (1994) ("States have created
diverse networks of judicially and legislatively crafted rules governing the foreclosure process,
to achieve what each of them considers the proper balance between the needs of lenders and
borrowers.")
18. See infra text accompanying notes 51-75.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 109-48.
20. See, e.g., Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201,203 (5th Cir. 1980). The
court's holding in Durrett encourages future foreclosure sale bid prices equal to at least 70%
of the fair market value of the property in order to avoid the possibility of the sale being set
aside as a fraudulent transfer under the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1994). Id.
See also COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-38-106(1) (West Supp. 1995) (requiring that the owner
of the debt being foreclosed "shall bid at least such owner's good faith estimate of the fair
market value of the property being sold [subject to reduction for certain amounts related to
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deficiencies,21 or to provide redemption rights' have largely been
unsuccessful in increasing the bid prices.
Rather than attempt to reach a proper balance of power .directly
through addressing the consequences of a failed system, the focus of
reform should shift to providing a foreclosure process fostering the one
ingredient essential to ensure higher bids, one conspicuously missing
from contemporary foreclosure sales: the interjection of true competition
among bidders that furthers a process that mimics a free market. The
key to success is a model of foreclosure in which the bid price is market
driven. Our concern, then, is not necessarily on the ultimate bid price
in any given foreclosure sale, but on the market conditions in which
potential bid prices live.
True competition among bidders in contemporary real estate markets
can exist only where all parties have access to adequate information
about the property and capital' to finance its purchase. The current
foreclosure processes should be reformed to foster atmospheric
conditions that allow interested parties to obtain access to information
and capital. This Article constructs a reform proposal whose linchpin is
the encouragement of access to information and capital in an effort to
promote competition in foreclosure sales.
Part II of the Article explores the development of foreclosure law,
with a hand on the pulse of the power struggles between borrower and
lender. A history of foreclosure law showing traditional power
confrontations demonstrates what presently drives the debate regarding
process reforms. Part II also analyzes the deficiencies of current
foreclosure systems and demonstrates the contemporary focus on power
and not process. Part III critiques competing reforms and proposals,
exposing weaknesses in process and failures in policy. Part III also
demonstrates why the legislature and judiciary have been ineffective in
their attempts to cure problems endemic to modern foreclosure law.
Part IV sets forth a proposal for reform with an application of the

costs of holding
and selling the property].").
21. See infra notes 109-120 and accompanying text for a discussion of anti-deficiency
legislation.
22. See infra notes 121-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of statutory
redemption legislation.
23. This statement is an obvious corollary of the generally accepted definition of "fair
market value." Without adequate information, a prospective purchaser will adjust her price
downward to compensate for the uncertainty. In addition, capital is an essential ingredient
of real estate purchase and sale transactions.
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proposal to various foreclosure scenarios.
The proposal constructed in this Article is market-driven and permits
a lender to initially elect one of three options. First, a lender may
retain the property in full satisfaction of the debt, but only after proper
notice is given to all parties in interest and no objections are lodged.
Essentially, this option mirrors strict foreclosure.2 4 A borrower or some
other party in interest may, in appropriate circumstances, lodge a timely
objection to the lender's selection of this option, thus forcing a lender
to elect one of the two remaining options. Second, a lender may
repossess and sell the property in a commercially reasonable manner.'
This option embraces a standard that focuses the parties' and the court's
attention on indicia or "badges" of fairness. The focus is functional; the
procedures employed, rather than the obtained bid price, are scrutinized.
In essence, this option marks the confluence of real property foreclosure
law with that of personal property law. 6 The standard-like approach27
allows lender and borrower to experiment, to employ new and different
procedures in an attempt to maximize the bid price. The standard
contained in the second option, however, infuses uncertainty in the
foreclosure process.' The third option speaks directly to that uncertainty. The third option permits a lender to sell the property pursuant
to a safe-harbor, a rule that provides that a lender is deemed to have
sold the property in a commercially29reasonable manner if it strictly
follows certain delineated procedures.

24. See infra note 66 for a description of "strict foreclosure."
25. Disposition of collateral in a "commercially reasonable manner" is the standard by
which personal property foreclosures are presently conducted. See U.C.C. § 9-504 (1985). The
Uniform Land Security Interest Act ("ULSIA"), would require that real property collateral
be sold pursuant to a sale that is in every respect reasonable. See infra notes 149-164 for a
discussion of the ULSIA.
26. See U.C.C. § 9-504 (1985).
27. For a discussion of rules and standards in the context of commercial law, see Jack
F. Williams, The Fallacies of Contemporary Fraudulent Transfer Models as Applied To
IntercorporateGuaranties:FraudulentTransfer Law as a Fuzzy System, 15 CARDOZO L. REv.

1403, 1452 (1994).
28. Because whether the real property collateral has been sold in a "commercially
reasonable manner" is largely a factual determination that must be made on a case by case
basis, the borrower could almost always challenge the sale or defend against a deficiency
action by alleging that the sale was not "commercially reasonable." Many such disputes
currently arise in the personal property foreclosure arena.
29. These procedures are set forth in Part IV of this article. See infra notes 185-189.
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DEVELOPMENT OF CONTEMPORARY FORECLOSURE MODELS

A. Confrontation Between Borrower and Lender: A Story"0
Let us assume that Sally practices in a lender-oriented jurisdiction.31
Both judicial and nonjudicial foreclosures are permitted, but as a
practical matter because of time, cost, and savings, virtually every
foreclosure in the jurisdiction is conducted pursuant to a power of
sale.32

In early May, one of Sally's large lending clients contacts her
regarding twenty home loans that are nonperforming, all of which are
The client is frustrated with the
at least two months in arrears.
borrowers, and has decided to accelerate the indebtedness33 and
foreclose on the properties. The client is confident of recouping all of
its money because, based on its estimates of the value of the properties,
sixty percent is the highest loan to value ratio of the properties involved.
The jurisdiction in which Sally practices requires that not less than
twenty days notice be provided to borrowers before an indebtedness
secured by their primary residence may be accelerated.34 Sally prompt-

30. See Mary J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Anti-discrimination Law, And A
Jurisprudencefor the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1331-32 (1991) (use of stories
is within a legitimate scholarly tradition); see also Richard Delgado, Storytelling for
Oppositionistsand Others: A Plea for Narrative,87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2439 (1989).
31. Jurisdictions that permit nonjudicial, or power of sale foreclosures, are generally
deemed to be more lender-oriented because such sales are less expensive and quicker. The
drafters of the ULSIA determined that foreclosures by contract power of sale were more
efficient than judicial foreclosures followed by statutory redemption. See ULSIA, prefatory
note, 7A U.L.A. 251 (Supp. 1996). Approximately one-half the states currently permit some
form of nonjudicial foreclosure. See infra note 82.
32. My own experience has borne this practice out. In participating in several hundred
foreclosures, I conducted every foreclosure through a power of sale. In fact, in those states
that recognize a power of sale clause, I am not even personally aware of someone foreclosing
through any other method.
33. Though it is sometimes possible to foreclose based on the past due installments
subject to the remaining indebtedness secured by the lien, most loan documents provide that
the lender may accelerate the entire indebtedness upon default, which lenders will generally
do. See Belzung v. Capital Bank, 598 S.W.2d 14, 15 (Tex. App. 1980) ("Failure to pay any
installment of this note when due or failure to carry out any of the terms, covenants and
conditions securing this note shall authorize the holder of this note, at holder's option, to
declare the whole of this note due and payable .... ").
34. Many jurisdictions provide special protection for indebtedness secured by the
debtor's residence. See, e.g., TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002(d) (West 1995). The statute
provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, the holder of the debt shall serve a
debtor in default under a deed of trust or other contract lien on real property used
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ly forwards to the various borrowers notices of intent to accelerate if the
arrearages are not cured by June 10. Within a few days of mailing the
notices, Sally receives phone calls from several of the defaulting
borrowers. Each of the borrowers tells Sally their story; their payments
are late because of lost jobs, sicknesses, disasters beyond their control,
and so forth. They explain that they have no where else to go and that
they intend to make their payments as promptly as possible. They also
demand more patience from the lender based on the long history of
prompt loan payments and the fact that the lender continues to be
adequately secured because of the loan to value ratio of the property.
Sally carefully explains to each caller that she understands and sympathizes with their plight, but that she must proceed if the arrearage is not
cured by June 10.
June 10th arrives, and after confirming with her client that the
arrearage has not been cured, Sally prepares and mails two documents
for each of the borrowers: a notice of acceleration of indebtedness and
a notice of foreclosure. The notice of foreclosure lists the jurisdiction's
minimum notice requirements 35 to conduct a nonjudicial sale. Specifically, the notice provides when the sale will occur; in this instance, the
sale is conducted the first Tuesday of the month between the hours of
10:00 A.M. and 4:00 P.M., as mandated by statute. Sally notes that the
first Tuesday of the month happens to be the Fourth of July, but posts
the property for sale on that day nonetheless because the first Tuesday
of the month is the only permissible foreclosure day. Sally is also aware
that it is permissible to foreclose on a holiday notwithstanding that the
courthouse will be closed.36 The location of the sale, as mandated by
statute and as specified in the notice of sale, is the courthouse steps of
the county where the property is located. The steps, obviously, will be
open. Advertising the sale to attract bidders again consists of merely
complying with the minimum requirements of the foreclosure statute,
as the debtor's residence with written notice by certified mail stating that the debtor
is in default under the deed of trust or other contract lien and giving the debtor at
least 20 days to cure the default before notice of sale can be given.
Ld. (emphasis added).
35. See, e.g., TEX PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002 (West 1995) (requiring that notice of sale
must designate the property to be sold, the area at the courthouse where the sale is to take
place, and a statement of the earliest time at which the sale will begin).
36. Fact that foreclosure day is a legal holiday and the courthouse is closed does not
necessarily affect the validity of a foreclosure sale conducted on that date. See, e.g., Koehler
v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 425 S.W.2d 889, 1891 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968) (holding that it is permissible for a deed of trust sale, equivalent to a court of equity proceeding, to be made on July
Fourth).
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which includes filing the notice of sale with the clerk's office and posting
the notice of sale on a bulletin board provided for such purposes at the
county courthouse. In the past, Sally wondered whether such notices
remain on the bulletin board for very long before they are removed by
some passerby, but for Sally, she has nonetheless complied with the
requirement of posting.
After the borrowers receive the notice of acceleration and notice of
foreclosure, again Sally receives calls from some of the borrowers trying
to stave off the sale of their homes. The reality that the property is
going to be sold and that they are going to be evicted is sinking in with
some of the borrowers for the first time. Some tell Sally that they have
decided to sell the property in order to salvage the equity in the property
above the loan amount. The real estate agent they listed the property
with last week said she would likely be unable to close the sale before
the foreclosure sale date of July 4, even if she received a contrazt
immediately. The borrowers want more time. Sally explains that the
only way to stop the foreclosure now3 7 is to pay the accelerated
indebtedness in full,3" together with costs and expenses, before the sale.
One of the borrowers wants Sally to tell her how she can pay the full
amount when she was not even able to make the monthly payment.
Sally diplomatically responds in a manner that lets the borrower know
that it is the borrower's concern, and concludes the conversation. Sally
notes that the borrower's tone is slightly more desperate, and at the
same time, more threatening than previous conversations.
The Fourth of July arrives and Sally proceeds to the courthouse steps
a little after noon to cry the sale of the properties. Sally intends to read
a script of the sale she prepared the day before. When Sally arrives at
the sale, two obviously distressed people are standing on the steps. Sally
learns that they are both borrowers whose homes she has posted for sale.
They have been waiting at the courthouse steps since 9:30 A.M.,

37. The borrower can stop the foreclosure sale by filing a bankruptcy petition. This

filing imposes an automatic stay that prevents the foreclosure from proceeding until the lender
obtains from the bankruptcy court an order for relief from the stay. See 11 U.S.C. § 362
(1994).
38. Once the lender has properly accelerated the debt, in many jurisdictions the
borrower does not have a unilateral right to reinstate the debt by paying to the lender the past
due installments unless the loan documents so provide. Some jurisdictions do, however,
provide borrowers the right to reinstate the loan at any time up to five days before the date
the sale is conducted by paying the arrearage along with foreclosure costs. See, e.g., CAL. CIv.
CODE § 2924c (West 1993).
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expecting the sale to begin at 10:00 A.M.3 9 When Sally walks up to the
steps, the borrowers begin to discuss their foreclosure with her. Only
now, rather than requesting that Sally not foreclose, they demand that
Sally not proceed because of alleged defects in the notice of sale and
other irregularities.' Sally proceeds nonetheless. One of the borrowers
videotapes the sale, hoping to either cause or catch a glitch in her
conduct during the sale.4 Predictably, no one is present to bid on the
properties and Sally,42 on behalf of her client, opens the bidding at an
amount significantly below both the debt and appraised value of each
property.43 Sally's opening bid turns out to be the high, and indeed, the
only bid for the property. Sally accepts the bid and proclaims the
property sold to her client." She returns to her car to head home and
make the best of the remainder of the Fourth of July, leaving behind two
befuddled, crushed, and irate ex-homeowners, and leaving behind a piece
of herself as well.
Two months later, Sally receives a phone call from an attorney
concerning the foreclosure of Bob's property. Bob's property was one
of the properties sold at the fourth of July sale and was purchased by
Sally's client for a credit bid of $50,000 against a $75,000 indebtedness
secured by the property. Sally anticipates that the attorney is representing Bob in the lawsuit Sally has commenced against Bob to collect the
$25,000 deficiency that resulted from the sale of the property. Instead,
Sally discovers that the attorney represents a creditor who had been
granted a $20,000 second lien on the property.45 This junior creditor is
39. The foreclosure sale need not necessarily begin at the time stated in the notice of
sale. For instance, Texas permits foreclosure sales to be held any time between the hours of
10:00 A.M. and 4:00 P.M. on the first Tuesday of each month and the sale can begin at the

time stated in the notice or within any time not later than three hours after that time. See
TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002 (West 1995).
40. Foreclosure sales can be enjoined or set aside based on defects in the notice of sale

or irregularities in the conduct of the sale. See generally NELSON & WHITMAN, supra, note
7, at § 7.22.
41.

Id.

42. The attorney representing the foreclosing lender is often appointed by the lender as
the trustee or substitute trustee and, in such capacity, conducts the foreclosure sale.
43. A bid amountof seventy percent of the appraised value was common in jurisdictions
that followed the Durrett Rule. See infra notes 130-138 for a discussion of the Durrett Rule.
The Durrett Rule has subsequently been rejected by the Supreme Court. BFP v. Resolution
Trust Corp., 114 S. Ct. 1757 (1994).

44. Sally, as trustee, will prepare and execute a trustee's deed, which she will record with
the county when the courthouse reopens.
45. Property may be encumbered by more than one lien. Some jurisdictions, however,
restrict liens on property secured by the borrower's residence to specific purposes. For
instance, liens on the borrower's residence in Texas are valid only for the purposes of purchase
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convinced that the property is worth at least $110,000 based on the
appraisal he made of the property at the time of its loan. The junior
creditor is upset and claims that he never received any notice of the sale,
and that if he had, he would have been willing to bid at least $100,000.
Sally confirms that she did not provide personal notice to the junior
lienholder, even though she was aware of his interest. She further
explains that in this jurisdiction the law does not require such notice to
be provided 6 and that, although many people have challenged the
constitutionality of the provision,47 it has thus far been upheld. Sally,
however, indicates to the attorney that her client may be willing to sell
the property to the junior lienholder. The attorney grumbles about the
inequities of such a sale, but states that his client may be interested in
buying the property. A few days later, Sally's client and the junior
lienholder agree to a sale of the property for $95,000. After documenting the agreement, Sally returns to the lawsuit pursuing the $25,000
deficiency against Bob, a right the lender retains under state law. 48 In
fact, assuming Bob has some assets, Sally's client may recover a total of
$120,000, a return to the lender that is $45,000 above the total indebtedness Bob owed.
The foreclosure process has been replete with frustration for both the
borrower and junior lien holder. There has been an ample supply of
hostility directed at the lender, as well as at a system that permits,
indeed mandates, such a process. Sally's client, the lender, does not care.
It is merely exercising its rights under the documents signed by the
borrowers 49 and under state foreclosure law.

therefore, improvements, or tax liens. See TEX. PROP CODE ANN. § 41.001 (West Supp. 1996).
46. Many jurisdictions do not require that the notice of sale be given to junior lien
holders. See, e.g., Gunter v. Tucker Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n, 229 S.E. 2d 662, 663 (Ga. 1976)
(ruling that the holder of the second-lien security deed was not entitled to notice of the
foreclosure sale other than that notice published once a week for four weeks). See also TEX.
PROP. CODE ANN. 51.002(b)(3) (West 1995) ("Notice of the sale ...must be given... [to]
each debtor who, according to the records of the holder of the debt, is obligated to pay the
debt.") (emphasis added).
47. See, e.g., Armenta v. Nussbaum, 519 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. App. 1975) (holding sale of
real property under power of sale in compliance with statute not sufficient to establish
significant state action or involvement for Fourteenth Amendment purposes).
48. Since the foreclosure sale price was less than the outstanding debt, a deficiency
resulted. Many jurisdictions prohibit deficiencies or otherwise limit the amount of deficiency.
49. As a practical matter, these are not necessarily rights that the lender "negotiated."
Lenders present borrowers with their standard form loan documents in residential lending
transactions, which borrowers can take or leave, but to which borrowers are unable to
negotiate changes even if the borrower knew what to ask for. See Mixon & Shepard, supra
note 2, at 458 ("[T]he home mortgage transaction itself is so highly standardized that it does
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This section has described the deficiencies in the present regime from
a human perspective. The common threads of frustration and hostility
are exposed through this story telling approach. 0 The following
sections unpack the legal deficiencies in a more traditional format.
B. Evolution of the Power Struggle Between Borrower and Lender
The study of foreclosure law is a study of power.5' From its very
be understood
inception, much of the evolution in foreclosure law can
52
by the power struggle between borrowers and lenders.
Like much of the law concerning real property, that portion of the
law pertaining to the foreclosure of real property liens can be traced to
the common law that developed during England's feudal period.53
During the 1500s, the English borrower who desired to obtain a loan
secured by the value of his real property would convey legal title to the
property by an absolute deed to the lender.54 The lender was obligated
to reconvey this property to the borrower only upon repayment in full
of the loan according to its terms.5 In the event the loan was not
repaid as agreed, the lender's obligation to reconvey terminated and the
borrower forfeited all rights in the property 6 Thus, foreclosure law
originated with the pendulum of power positioned firmly in the lender's

").
not reflect negotiated consent ....
50. See supra sources cited in note 30.
51. The Supreme Court's tacitly recognized this struggle of power in BFPv. Resolution
Trust Corp. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 114 S. Ct. 1757, 1763 (1994) ("States have created
diverse networks of judicially and legislatively crafted rules governing the foreclosure process,
to achieve what each of them considers the proper balance between the needs of lenders and
borrowers.")
52. For a general history on the development of foreclosure law, see 4 AMERICAN LAW
OF PROPERTY: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 427-579 (A.

James Casner, ed., 1952).
53. Mortgages in some form existed for centuries prior to this time. See generally
GEORGE E. OSBORNE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES

2-7 (2d ed. 1970).

However, foreclosure law is generally considered to have begun in medieval England. See
BFP,114 S.Ct. at 1763.
54. The mortgagee took possession because of the "abhorrence of the church of the
practice of charging interest. . . . The pious Christian lender was forced to take possession
of the property so that he could reap the rents and issues as recompense for his money lent."
9 JOHN S. GRIMES, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 693 (1958)
(citation omitted). See also, NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 7, § 1.2.

55. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 7, §1.3. The date by which the loan was
required to be repaid in full was generally referred to as "law day." If repayment was not
made by that day for any reason, including the disappearance of the lender, the borrower
forfeited all rights to the property.
56. Id.
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camp.
The pendulum of power swung towards the borrower with the
intervention of the Equity Courts, which viewed the borrower's forfeiture
of any interest in the property as unduly harsh. 7 Borrowers were
successful in convincing the Equity Courts that they should be allowed
to redeem their property, even after the date originally agreed upon
between the borrower and lender.5" This right to pay the outstanding
indebtedness and reclaim their property within a reasonable period even
after default was known as the equity of redemption. 9 Pursuant to the
equitable right of redemption, upon payment in full, a lender was
required to return possession and title to the defaulting borrower. °
Lenders were not pleased with the impact and uncertainty caused by
a borrower's equity of redemption. In response, lenders attempted to
readjust the power structure by forcing borrowers to limit or waive their
equity of redemption as a condition to making the loan. 61 However,
courts promptly struck down such attempts as an impermissible
"clogging" of the borrower's equitable right of redemption.62
57. Id. Equity courts viewed strict foreclosure as unduly harsh because it was an
absolute rule under which the borrower lost all interest in his property, irrespective of the
amount of the debt in relation to the value of the property. Id.
58. Id. Initially, the chancery courts only intervened upon the showing of fraud, duress,
or other equitable reasons. Eventually, however, the equity courts allowed all borrower's to
redeem their property, so long as it was within a reasonable time period. See BFP, 114 S.Ct.
at 1757.
59. BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1763. The recognition by the chancery courts of the equity of
redemption for all borrowers marked a significant point in English history toward the
increasing shift of power from the common law courts to the chancery courts. See generally
OSBORNE, supra note 53, § 6.
60. BFP, 114 S. Ct. at 1763.
61. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 7, § 3.1.
62. See, e.g., Samuel v. Jarrah Timber & Wood Paving Corp., 1904 App. Cas. 323 The
Samuel case is an example of an early English case that prohibited the clogging of the
borrower's equitable right of redemption. Id. The court stated:
[N]o contract between a mortgagor and mortgagee made at the time of the mortgage
and as part of the mortgage transaction, or, in other words, as one of the terms of
the loan can be valid if it prevents the mortgagor from getting back his property or
paying off what is due on his security. Any bargain which has that effect is invalid,
and is inconsistent with the transaction being a mortgage.
I& at 329.
This prohibition against "clogging" the borrower's equity of redemption continues today.
See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/15-1601 (West 1992) (residential borrower may not waive
right of equitable redemption); see generally, NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 7, § 3.1 n.1.
The first use of the term "clog" appeared in Bacon case where the court stated "[t]he
mortgagee will suddenly bestow unnecessary costs upon the mortgaged lands, of purposes to
clog the lands, to prevent the mortgagor's redemption." NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 7,
§ 3.1 n.1 (citing Bacon v. Bacon, Tot. 133-4 (1639)).
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A borrower's equitable right of redemption was especially intolerable
from a lender's viewpoint because there was no limitation on a
borrower's right to redeem, other than the right had to be exercised
within a reasonable time.6' This uncertainty caused great difficulty in
a lender's use and transfer of the land.' 4 Lenders were successful
ultimately in persuading courts to modify the equity of redemption to
require borrowers to redeem within a specific time.65 An untimely
redemption was ineffective. This throttling of the equity of redemption
resulted in the creation of strict foreclosure.' Thus, the pendulum
swung decisively back to the lender.
When the United States inherited the common law from England, it
also inherited the foreclosure process described above.67 The early
American courts, however, viewed strict foreclosure as unduly harsh
because it did not protect a borrower's equity in the property.6" A
lender could obtain title to land, unfettered by any remaining claim or
interest of a borrower. It was not unusual that the property had a value
several times the amount of the debt.69
Over time, the states modified the foreclosure process to force a
lender to conduct a public sale to generate proceeds to retire all or a
portion of the indebtedness.7" The theory fueling the public sale model
was that mortgaged property would be sold at or near its fair market
value and any proceeds received by the lender in excess of its indebtedness would be delivered to the mortgagor.7 The public sale served the
same function as strict foreclosure in cutting off a borrower's right of

63.

BFP, 114 U.S. at 1763.

64. Id. ("The courts' continued expansion of the period of redemption left lenders in
a quandary, since title to forfeited property could remain clouded for years after law day.").
65. Upon request of the lender after the borrower had failed to pay by law day, the

courts of equity would issue a decree ordering the borrower to pay the debt, interest, and costs
within a certain period. If the borrower failed to comply with this decree, their equitable right
of redemption was "foreclosed," and their right to redeem was forever barred. NELSON &
WHITMAN, supra note 7, § 1.3.
66. The term "strict foreclosure" actually originated in the United States in the early
eighteenth century. See Wechsler, supra note 1, at 857 n.44 (citing OSBORNE, supra note 53,
§335). This method of foreclosure, rarely used in the United States today except in the area
of personal property foreclosures, resulted in the property being forfeited to the lender
regardless of its value in relation to the debt. No sale of the property was involved. See
NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 7, § 1.3.

67. Wechsler, supra note 1, at 858.
68. Id.

69. Id.
70. Id.

71. Ia.
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The pendulum of power swung back to the

borrower.7 2
Apparently, early foreclosure sales could indeed be expected to
generate reasonable proceeds because of the high level of activity in the
real estate market.73 However, bid prices (in relation to the value of
the property being sold) soon declined.74 In an effort to limit further
the lender's power, legislatures enacted redemption statutes, antideficiency legislation, and foreclosure moratoria.
As the country continued to expand and develop, many states,
especially those outside of the northeast, began to permit lenders to

foreclose pursuant to power of sale clauses75 in the collateral document.
These nonjudicial foreclosures eliminated the time and cost of court
supervision, but also eliminated protections afforded a borrower by
having a third-party neutral overseeing the foreclosure proceedings.
1. Current Foreclosure Law
Presently, foreclosure models may be divided into two broad
categories: judicial foreclosures and nonjudicial foreclosures. A few
states still employ a strict foreclosure alternative.76
72. At first glance, the adoption of foreclosure by sale, rather than strict foreclosure,
appears to be favorable to the borrower. In actuality, however, the adoption may be
detrimental to the borrower. See infra text accompanying note 89.
73. Wechsler, supranote 1, at 859. Professor Wechsler states "[d]uring the development
of foreclosure by sale in the United States, the high level of activity in the real estate market
justified the conclusion that competitive bidding would assure fair prices." Id.
74. Id.
75. Approximately one-half the states permit non-judicial foreclosures. See infra note
82.
76. Connecticut and Vermont are the only states that permit strict foreclosure. See
NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 7, § 7.10. However, many states allow property to be sold
pursuant to a real estate contract containing a forfeiture provision in the event the buyer
defaults. Washington is one such jurisdiction. See Thomas Leo McKiernan, Note, Preserving
Real Estate ContractFinancingIn Washington: Resisting the Pressureto Eliminate Forfeiture,
70 WASH. L. REv. 227 (1995). The description of the lender's exercise of its remedy of the
forfeiture clause, the court's restriction on its use, and the outside limit of the "grace period"
are reminiscent of the development of strict foreclosure:
Judges control the enforcement of forfeiture clauses through equitable power,
relieving buyers from forfeiture to prevent any result that would be inequitable,
unjust, or shocking to the court's conscience. Upon determining that enforcing a
forfeiture would be inequitable, a court employs various remedial techniques. Many
courts set a date by which a defaulting buyer may pay the amount remaining on a
contract and redeem the land from forfeiture. While some courts view this right as
unconditional, other courts allow it only when the buyer has a substantial amount of
equity in the property or when there has been no bad faith on the buyer's part.
Common law courts in Washington often allowed this "grace period" in which the
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Every jurisdiction permits some form of judicial foreclosure of a real
property lien so the secured lender can reduce the indebtedness owed it.
As its name implies, a judicial foreclosure requires a lender to commence
a foreclosure action in state court. This is a lawsuit against the borrower
as well as others such as junior lienholders that may hold interests in the
property the lender seeks to extinguish.77 Ultimately, after months or
possibly years, the court orders the public sale of the property to
foreclose the lien.7" The sale, once ordered, is generally conducted by
a public official, such as a sheriff, and appears conspicuously like the
nonjudicial foreclosure sale described below.
Judicial foreclosures are governed by statute. A lender initiates a
judicial foreclosure by sending the mortgagor a notice of default and
notice of intent to accelerate the indebtedness if the default is not cured
within a specified time period. If the mortgagor fails to cure the default
(which generally consists of making all past due payments), the lender
accelerates the indebtedness and institutes a legal proceeding against the
borrower and all other necessary parties. 79 Once the lender has
obtained a decree for the foreclosure sale, the judge, sheriff, or a court
appointed official will conduct the sale. 0 Afterwards, such statutes

buyer could pay the remaining balance of the contract.
Id. at 231 (footnotes omitted). Some jurisdictions have developed the theme further, totally
eliminating the exercise of forfeiture because of the perceived harshness and requiring a public
sale. See Sebastion v. Floyd, 585 S.W.2d 381 (Ky. 1979) (judicially eliminating forfeiture);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 11A (West 1994) (statutorily eliminating forfeiture).
77. Unlike some nonjudicial sales, junior interest holders must be provided notice in
judicial foreclosures if their interest is to be extinguished. See generally Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,314 (1950) (holding that a fundamental requirement
of due process is "notice reasonably calculated under the circumstances to apprise parties of
the action and to afford them an opportunity to be heard.").
78. Judicial foreclosures generally require a great deal more time to complete. See
Roland Boyd, et. al., Comment, Cost and Time Factors in Foreclosureof Mortgages, 3 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 413 (1968). See generally NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 7, § 7.11.
Nelson & Whitman state:
A typical action in equity to foreclose and sell involves a long series of steps: a
preliminary title search to determine all parties in interest; filing of the foreclosure
bill of complaint and lis pendens notice; service of process; a hearing, usually by a
master in chancery who then reports to the court; the decree or judgment; notice of
sale; actual sale and issuance of certificate of sale; report of the sale; proceedings for
determination of the right to any surplus; possible redemptions from foreclosure sale;
and the entry of a decree for a deficiency.
Id.
79. See generally, NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 7, § 7.11.
80. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. ST. ANN. 5/15 - 1507(b) (West 1992) (allowing any judge
or sheriff to conduct a judicial sale).
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typically require the court to confirm the foreclosure sale. "
In contrast, a nonjudicial foreclosure skirts the court system. Under
a contractual power of sale contained in the collateral document, a
lender or some "agent" for the borrower, in compliance with state
foreclosure law, sells the property to the highest bidder in a public sale.
Slightly more than one-half the states allow at least some form of
nonjudicial foreclosure.8 2
Nonjudicial foreclosures are also governed by statutory law which
varies somewhat from state to state. Like its judicial counterpart, the
lender initiates a nonjudicial foreclosure by providing notice of default
and intent to accelerate to the mortgagor. In the event the default is not
cured, the mortgaged property is sold at the nonjudicial foreclosure sale,
conducted by a trustee 3 selected by the lender, or perhaps the lender
itself.'l Nonjudicial foreclosure sales typically do not require confirmation," and no court involvement is necessary in the foreclosure proceeding. Nonjudicial sales are generally much quicker and less
expensive. In addition, the notice requirements are generally less
stringent.8 6 Many jurisdictions do not require personal notice to any
party other than those liable on the debt. 7 Consequently, junior
interests in the land are often not personally notified, and must rely on
the pasting or publication of the notice of sale.
The typical foreclosure sale for both judicial and nonjudicial sales
consists of offering the mortgaged property to "bidders" who have little,
if any, information about the physical condition or legal title of the
property being offered. Any bid submitted by a bidder is without any
condition or contingency regarding the title or physical condition of the
property, or the bidder's ability to obtain financing. The high bidder
81. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. ST. ANN. 5/15 - 1508 (West Supp. 1996).
82. Over 30 jurisdictions allow power of sale foreclosures in some form, including
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Georgia,
Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See generally
NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 7, § 7.19.
83. See generally LEFCOE, REAL ESTATE TRANSACrTIONS 511 (1993). Today, in most
states that allow nonjudicial foreclosure, anybody (even the lender) can lawfully serve as the
trustee except the borrower. Id
84. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-21(1996) (providing that a bank or savings association
can be both trustee and beneficiary).
85. Confirmation of the nonjudicial sale may be required if the lender intends to seek
a deficiency against the borrower. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §44-14-161 (Harrison 1991).
86. See, e.g., TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002 (West 1995).
87. Id.
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typically must be able to pay at the sale, in cash. Obviously, these
limitations on a prospective bidder's ability to obtain information, inspect
the premises, and arrange financing exert a downward pressure on the
bid price. Experience proves this point.
Consequently, a large number of foreclosure sales fail to attract any
bidder other than the foreclosing lender, who is left to compete against
itself." Even in the foreclosure sales that manage to attract a handful
of bidders, the lack of adequate information and availability of financing
options stifles true competitive bidding. In short, foreclosure sales are
neither conducted in a commercially reasonable manner nor by a method
that can be expected to produce true competitive bidding. This absence
of competitive bidding generally results, not surprisingly, in inadequate
sale proceeds obtained at the foreclosure sale.
Often overlooked in the literature is that both judicial and nonjudicial
foreclosures converge at the point of sale. To be sure, in one, a public
official conducts the sale and in the other, a lender or some agent, but
the sale process is strikingly similar once a court enters an order
permitting the foreclosure.
C Breakdowns in the CurrentSystem
By their historical nature, foreclosure sales are not designed to
produce the best possible price for the property. A good price at a
foreclosure sale is an accident. So what is the purpose of a foreclosure
sale? Simply, it is the transfer of ownership of the property from a
borrower to a lender and little more. Thus, for all practical purposes,
present foreclosure models remain deeply rooted to the concept of strict
foreclosure. Essentially, contemporary models modify strict foreclosure
to permit a lender to opt out of the "strict foreclosure" regime by also
pursuing a deficiency judgment against the borrower. Anti-deficiency
legislation does not modify this result; it merely reunites the foreclosure
model with its strict foreclosure roots.
If the intent of a foreclosure sale is merely to exist as a condition
precedent to the transfer of ownership from borrower to lender, why
engage in the charade of a public sale? Common law strict foreclosure
is more efficient and no less fair than current foreclosure regimes.8 9 In

88. See Robert K. Lifton, Real Estate in Trouble: Lender's Remedies Need an Overhaul,
31 BUS. LAW 1927, 1937 (1976) (noting that the lender is the successful bidder at 99% of the
foreclosure sales).
89. In fact, current foreclosure regimes may actually be more onerous to the borrower
because the borrower, absent anti-deficiency legislation, is now vulnerable to the risk of a
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fact, the only impact that the current system appears to have on a
foreclosure sale that differentiates it from strict foreclosures under
common law is in situations where a lender is over secured. Under such
circumstances, there is a greater likelihood that a third party may bid
more than the debt and purchase the property at foreclosure.9" But
even then, a borrower still loses; it is the third party that reaps the
equity.
Let us explore more fully the reasons why foreclosure sales fail to
attract viable and interested bidders and the concomitant reasonable
price that can be expected to accompany such bidders. Think back, if
you will, to the travails of Bob, whose $110,000 home was foreclosed
because of his inability to service the outstanding $75,000 loan balance.
Bob watched as the lender purchased the property for a credit bid of
$50,000 and then endured the additional trauma of being slapped with
a $25,000 deficiency judgment.
Why did the property only bring $50,000 at the foreclosure? And
why was the lender the only interested (and in fact only) bidder at the
sale? Was it because the property's value was only $50,000? Likely not,
because as you recall, a junior creditor purchased the property from the
lender less than two months later for $95,000. What then?
The reason for such a dismal failure of the current foreclosure
process is its inability to generate competitive bidding. The failure to
generate competitive bidding may be attributed primarily to two factors:
(1) the lack of adequate information, and (2) the failure to meet the

credit needs of potential purchasers.
What types of information do potential bidders need? One should
first consider the steps taken by a prospective purchaser in the purchase
of a home in a nonforeclosure setting. First, that purchaser obtains
information about the availability of property for sale, usually through
the services of a real estate broker, by pouring over the real estate
advertisements, or by noting a "for sale" sign in the front yard of some
property. Second, the potential purchaser gathers information about the
home's physical condition by making arrangements to view and inspect
the home herself (usually several times), by speaking with and asking
deficiency. Pursuant to strict foreclosure under the early common law, there was no effort to
place a value on the retained property. That would be applied to reduce the debt and the
lender was presumed to have been repaid in full with the property.
90. This is the case because of the nature of the lender's oversecured status. By
definition, the value of the property exceeds the indebtedness secured by the property and
where the property's value greatly exceeds the indebtedness, the likelihood of third parties
entering the bidding process increases. See generally Wechsler, supra note 1.
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questions of the seller,9 and often by employing a professional inspector to assist her in determining the home's physical condition. Finally,
the potential purchaser obtains information regarding the title of the
property, usually by hiring an attorney to search the real property
records and by obtaining title insurance. Further, the potential purchaser
can ask
the seller questions and possibly obtain warranties from the
92
seller.

On reflection, all of these steps appear to be prudent and reasonable
for someone contemplating a relatively large investment. In sum, a
prospective purchaser in a typical sales situation obtains the following:
(1) information regarding the availability of the property;
(2) information regarding the physical condition of the property;
and
(3) information regarding legal title to the property.
In contrast, what information do bidders at a foreclosure sale have
regarding the availability, physical condition, and the state of legal title
of property being foreclosed? Property posted for foreclosure does not
involve a real estate agent who can alert her customers and other agents
to the availability of the property or make arrangements to have the
property listed and described in the multiple listing service.93 No
arrangement is made by a real estate broker or anyone else to have a
"For Sale" sign placed in the yard of the property, or an advertisement
placed in the "Real Estate For Sale" section of the local newspaper.
Little is done to entice potential bidders to the sale. Rather, any party
potentially interested in the property must ferret out the information
herself by making special trips to the courthouse to read the foreclosure
notices posted on the bulletin board, or by studying the legal notices in

91. This information is sometimes incorporated into the contract of sale as representations and warranties by the seller. Some jurisdictions mandate disclosure of the physical
condition of the house. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2079 (West 1996) (requiring that a broker
listing a one-to-four family dwelling conduct a reasonably competent and visual inspection of
the property offered for sale and to disclose to that prospective purchaser all facts materially
affecting the value or desirability of the property).
92. These warranties, concerning the property's physical condition, should not be
confused with the deed warranties which cover the legal title to the property. Many sellers,
especially of new homes, now offer warranties guaranteeing the property's physical condition
as an inducement to the purchaser. The warranties also reflect the seller's efforts to define
their legal responsibilities for any home defects.
93. A multiple listing is "an agreement between the owner of real estate and a broker
in which the broker will permit other brokers to sell property for a percentage of his commission
[a] [d]evice used by real estate brokers to give wide exposure to properties listed"
with him. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 916 (5th ed. 1979).
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her local daily or perhaps legal newspapers. 94
Even where a party is diligent and persistent enough to obtain the
information, she must continue to persevere and remain undaunted when
she reads the description of the property being offered for sale:
All that tract or parcel of land lying and being in Land Lot 302
of the 18th District of Dekalb County, Georgia, being portions of
Lots 33 and 34, of Block B, Cambridge Park Subdivision and
being more fully described as Tract B of that certain survey
prepared by McNally & Patrick, recorded in Plat Book 80, Page
56, Records of Dekalb County, Georgia."
She must be able to translate that description into 1300 Ragley Hall
Road, Atlanta, Georgia 30319.
Suffice it to say that the group of potential bidders has likely shrunk
considerably. Even those stalwarts able to determine which property is
to be sold must also guess the precise time the sale will be held, or be
willing to spend their day at the courthouse steps to be sure they are
present when the sale begins.96 Even by waiting all day at the courthouse, there is no assurance that they will be present at the sale of the
property. The lender may have elected, unilaterally, to pass the
foreclosure to the next month without any notice. 97 Things get worse.
Those interested in purchasing the property will also be interested
in obtaining information regarding the physical condition of the
improvements on the property.9 Potential purchasers may contact the

94. "In view of the paucity of meaningful information available to the average reader,
not surprisingly, notice of the sale never reaches the general real estate market, and few
bidders appear at the sale. Clearly, the statutory publication requirements must be modified
to implement a realistic advertising and price-maximizing function." Scott B. Ehlich,
Avoidance of ForeclosureSales as FraudulentConveyances: Accommodating State and Federal
Objectives, 71 VA. L. REV. 933, 977 (1985).
95. Official real property descriptions read like riddles written in Old English. Often,
the legal description looks nothing like the street address. Thus, it becomes a formidable task
to discern just what property is being struck at the foreclosure sale. See Grant S. Nelson,
Deficiency Judgments After Real Estate Foreclosuresin Missouri: Some Modest Proposals,47
Mo. L. REV. 151, 151 ("[W]hile foreclosure statutes require notice by publication to potential
third party bidders ... because the publication is technical in nature, a potential third party
purchaser has little idea what real estate is being sold.").
96. See, e.g., TEX. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002 (West 1995) (property may be sold
within a three-hour selling window between the hours of 10:00 A.M. to 4:00 P.M.).
97. A lender may pass the foreclosure sale for a variety of reasons, including defects in
notice and posting, defects in the loan or collateral documents, a stand-still agreement with
the borrower or some third party, inconvenience, etc.
98. Again, information on the property has a direct relationship to ultimate interest and
price. Lack of information drives interest in the property down substantially. Those who
remain interested adjust their price downward accordingly.
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lender (or its attorney) listed in the notice of sale and attempt to make
arrangement to inspect the property. Although the lender may allow an
inspection, it is the borrower that is in possession of the property.99
Potential bidders could attempt to arrange with the borrower a time to
inspect the property, but the borrower is unlikely to be receptive to the
idea of providing home tours to potential purchasers of the very home
the borrower does not want to be sold.1"°
Likewise, attempts to elicit information from the borrower are likely
to be unsuccessful and the existence of an inspection report from a
professional inspector is unheard of. Potential bidders must resign
themselves to gathering information about the property's physical
condition by driving past the property and viewing it from the street.
Potential purchasers also need information regarding the legal title
of the property to be conveyed at foreclosure.'' Many potential
bidders will be sophisticated enough to realize that the lien being
foreclosed may be junior to prior monetary liens or encumbrances, and
that any purchaser at the foreclosure sale will be acquiring title subject
to those liens and encumbrances. Consequently, those bidders will know
to adjust their bid accordingly.
Obtaining information regarding the legal title to the property is the
bright spot for potential bidders, at least those willing to bear the
expense of obtaining such information. Foreclosure of the lien will wipe
out any junior lien or encumbrance created after the lien being
foreclosed by the lender. By searching the real property records,
prospective purchasers can ascertain the status of the legal title at the
time of the lien's creation. Prospective purchasers could make arrangements for an experienced attorney to perform these matters or the
interested bidder may be able to obtain a title commitment from a title
insurance company. The cost, anticipated to between $150 to $500, is
significant, but not prohibitive. However, it must be kept in mind that
99. The borrower generally remains in possession until after foreclosure. See, e.g.,
ALASKA STAT. §29-45-430 (Michie 1992).
100. Notice that borrowers are engaging in self-destructive behavior in many instances.
Usually, it behooves borrowers to help in the marketing and sale of the property. After all,
it is the borrower that has the most to gain in increasing the bid price at a foreclosure sale and
thereby reduce his deficiency or protect his equity. Unfortunately, either hope or despair
colors the actions of the borrower who often does not participate in the foreclosure process.
101. In particular, potential purchasers should know if the lien being foreclosed is junior
to some other lien. The foreclosure by a junior lienholder does not extinguish a senior lien.
Thus, the purchaser at the foreclosure sale would take junior to the prior-recorded lien. A
purchaser with knowledge about the record title of the property would adjust her price
accordingly.
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this is a cost that the prospective purchaser must bear to obtain
information which, when received, may eliminate any of the potential
bidder's interest because of prior liens or encumbrances that will survive
the foreclosure. Furthermore, the potential bidder must accept the risk
of wasted expense when the foreclosure is passed or indefinitely
canceled." z Potential bidders may be required to obtain information
on several properties, incurring significant out-of-pocket expenditures,
before being the successful high bidder on any single property. This cost
must be recouped and the maximum bid price is discounted once again
to absorb the cost of obtaining information on the legal title to
properties. The pool of potential bidders shrinks once again, losing
those bidders unwilling to bear the frustration, expense, and risk of
inadequate information.
In addition to the lack of key information, the lack of available credit
is a major obstacle in the quest to generate competitive bidding at
foreclosure sales. Transactions involving the purchase and sale of real
property almost always involve credit to complete the transaction.
Transactions in the typical nonforeclosure setting are generally initiated
when a purchaser submits an offer to purchase. This offer to purchase
is typically made expressly contingent on the ability to obtain adequate
financing to complete the purchase. After an offer is accepted, the
purchaser gathers financial information to submit to the lender for the
lender's analysis and verification. In addition, before committing to
make a loan, the lender likely will require an appraisal and survey of a
subject property. Successfully obtaining funds to purchase real estate
requires a great deal of time, effort, and money.
Contrast the typical scenario with the credit needs of potential
bidders at a foreclosure sale. The typical foreclosure sale requires the
high bidder to pay in cash. °3 Very few parties have adequate resources to pay the purchase price in cash.
Arranging credit before the sale is impractical for the vast majority
of bidders for several reasons. First, few potential bidders are willing to
undergo the time and expense associated with obtaining a loan commitment without some reasonable assurance of purchasing the property.
Second, even if the potential bidder wanted to expend the time and

102. A potential bidder does not have standing to force the foreclosure sale. Thus, the
bidder may be out considerable sums if the lender decides to pass or indefinitely suspend the
foreclosure sale.
103. See generally Robert M. Washburn, The Judicialand Legislative Response to Price
Inadequacy In Mortgage ForeclosureSales, 53 S. CAL. REV. 843, 849 (1980).
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funds on the chance that she would be the high bidder, it is highly
unlikely that any lender would lend without the opportunity to inspect,
appraise, and survey the property. Even in the event a potential bidder
could obtain a loan commitment, the time constraints may render the
process infeasible. The notice of sale from which potential bidders learn
of the sale is often not posted until twenty-one days before the sale.
This generally does not allow potential bidders enough time in which to
secure funds. It should be no surprise that the majority of foreclosure
sales occur without an observer, much less an actual bidder other than
the lender, and true competitive bidding very rarely occurs.
This plethora of deficiencies in contemporary foreclosure regimes
results in inadequate sales proceeds. This poses an interesting question
that provides an illuminating glimpse at the core of the present problem.
Why aren't lenders concerned about the proceeds generated? After all,
lenders rely on the collateral for repayment. It would appear reasonable
to expect lenders to attempt to achieve adequate bid prices at foreclosure sales to reduce the indebtedness owed them.
The answer is obvious. Lenders are not relying on the foreclosure
sale to obtain repayment. Rather, lenders foreclose to control their
collateral, to cut the borrower out of the title picture, and not as a means
of disposing of the collateral. 1" Lenders generally anticipate being the
purchaser at foreclosure sales. Consequently, they anticipate bidding in
an amount sufficient to protect their interest in the property and no
more. This generally means a credit bid by the lender based on a
percentage of the loan amount outstanding, and not in proportion to the
value of the property.
If lenders were prohibited from purchasing at a foreclosure sale, and
were instead required to accept the foreclosure sales proceeds and
release their lien, they would (i) stop making real property loans
altogether, (ii) only loan such percentage of the property value as a
104. See Maury B. Poscover, A Commercially Reasonable Sale Under Article 9:
Commercial,Reasonable, andFairto All Involved, 28 LOYOLA L. REv. 235 (1994). Professor
Poscover compares personal property foreclosures to real property foreclosures and criticizes
the latter stating:
Typically, lenders are the successful bidders at foreclosure sales. After buying the
property the lenders take the property into their portfolios. They then can take such
action as is necessary to obtain a fair price, such as publicizing the availability of the

property in publications likely to engender interest in the property. Frequently, they
hire real estate agents to locate prospective purchasers. Interestingly, they follow
procedures similar to what is now customary as part of an Article 9 commercially
reasonable sale.
Id.at 246.
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lender felt confident anyone would bid at foreclosure, (iii) charge
significantly higher interest for all real property loans to compensate for
those that default, or (iv) market the property in a fashion other than as
prescribed by the current foreclosure methods. One can be certain
lenders would not continue to dispose of their collateral as they currently
do, unless the loan to value ratio practically assured the lender of
repayment, or the lender was confident that it could collect a deficiency
judgment against the borrower.
Under present foreclosure regimes, a lender does not have an
incentive to market the property in any manner other than what is
required by state foreclosure procedures. In the event the property
brings less than its fair value, the lender will bid, obtain control of the
property, and re-market the property in a more conventional manner.
If by chance the property attains a bid in excess of the lender's debt, or
higher than the value placed on the property by the lender, the lender
can accept the other bid and be repaid in full (or pursue a deficiency if
appropriate and allowed). Though the lender may benefit if the lender
is the buyer and is able to resell it later at a higher price, the lender is
not penalized for the inadequate marketing under either situation. Only
the borrower suffers.
One mechanism to provide lenders with an incentive to better market
the property is obvious: prohibit the lender from purchasing at the
foreclosure sale and require the lender to release its lien in exchange for
the foreclosure sale proceeds. 10 5 There are several reasons why this
mechanism is inadequate. Many inadequacies have already been
described: lenders may stop lending altogether, require larger downpayments or other collateral, charge higher interest, or a combination of
°
these.'O
There are additional deficiencies. On occasion, collateral,
whether real or personal property, will generate bid prices insufficient in
relation to the true value of the collateral despite all reasonable efforts
to market the property. This market failure should be borne by the
borrower. This is a risk inherent in the property ownership and should
not be allocated to the lender. Prohibiting the lender from purchasing
does not directly transfer the risk to the lender if the lender is able to
pursue a deficiency judgment, but as a practical matter, the risk is

105. If a lender cannot purchase the property and must release its lien upon the
foreclosure sale, the incentive of the lender to better market the property dramatically
increases. The lender must find prospective purchasers willing to bid at the property's fair
value (at least the amount of the outstanding debt) or defer the right to foreclose.
106. See supra p. 524.
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transferred to the lender whenever the borrower is judgment proof."c7
Allowing lenders to bid will not only help protect lenders against the risk
of market failure, but should also help to minimize or eliminate the
market failure.
Another inadequacy of reforming foreclosure laws by prohibiting
bidding by lenders is that it would not go far enough in many situations.
An oversecured lender would still lack incentive to properly market the
property because even if poorly marketed, the property could still be
expected to generate proceeds sufficient to repay the debt. In these
circumstances, only the borrower's equity would suffer as a result of poor
marketing.
Finally, prohibiting a lender from purchasing at the foreclosure is
inadequate and unfair to the lender; there are certain features of the
current foreclosure processes that are beyond the lender's control. For
example, present foreclosure models allow the borrower to remain in
possession until after the foreclosure sale. This prevents the lender from
showing the property to potential purchasers and from making needed
repairs to the property. It also, on occasion, will cause the lender and
prospective purchasers to be unsure whether the possessing borrower will
adequately maintain, or even refrain from destroying, the property
during the period preceding the foreclosure.
A better model for foreclosure law would address the current
deficiencies to allow the lender to gain control of the property, i.e.,
repossess the property,03 and then require the lender to dispose of the
collateral in a commercially reasonable manner. The lender would be
allowed to be a purchaser at such sale. Of course, any foreclosure will
result in the ouster of the borrower, but imposing a commercially
reasonable standard does provide the lender with an incentive to
maximize sales proceeds; the lender will want to avoid liability for
damages incurred from commercially unreasonable activities. This, in
turn, serves to protect the borrower's equity or minimize the deficiency.
This proposal is explored further in Part IV below. First, however, this
paper explores competing models for reform.
107. One study has indicated lenders are unlikely to pursue deficiencies in any event.

See Wechsler, supra note 1, at 878 (reporting that in ninety-nine studied cases in which the
foreclosure sale left a deficiency, the lender obtained a deficiency in only one case, and even

that judgment was not satisfied). See also Mixon & Shephard, supra note 2, at 483-84 (arguing
that deficiencies should be eliminated entirely, with the risk being handled by the mortgage
insurance industry).
108. For the counterpart remedy in the arena of loans secured by personal property, see
U.C.C. § 9-503 (1985).
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COMPETING MODELS FOR FORECLOSURE LAW REFORM

A. Anti-deficiency Legislation
Anti-deficiency judgment legislation prohibits a lender from obtaining
a personal judgment against the borrower if the proceeds at the
foreclosure sale are inadequate to pay the outstanding loan balance
secured by the property.1"9 In essence, anti-deficiency legislation has
the effect of turning what would otherwise be personal liability loans into
nonrecourse loans."' The Great Depression spawned much of the
anti-deficiency type legislation,"' as legislatures sought to provide some
type of relief for borrowers.
Several states have enacted some form of anti-deficiency legislation. 2 The precise form the legislation takes varies from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction. Some legislation, for instance, limits the borrower protection afforded by anti-deficiency legislation to debt incurred for the
purchase price of the mortgaged property."' Others prohibit deficiencies when a particular type of foreclosure process is utilized, typically a
foreclosure pursuant to a private power of sale." Still other states
may permit a deficiency, but require that the deficiency be calculated by
using the property's fair market value at the time of foreclosure rather
than the actual bid price obtained at the foreclosure sale."'

109. For an example of what appears to be an absolute prohibition on deficiency
judgments, see S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §44-8-20 (Michie Supp. 1986). South Dakota, however,
allows deficiencies on purchase money mortgages held by federal agencies or instrumentalities.
Id. The ULSIA (discussed infra, notes 149-64), likewise would prohibit any liability for a
deficiency, notwithstanding any agreement, after foreclosure of a mortgage on property bought
for individual use as a personal residence. ULSIA § 511(b), 7A U.L.A. 295 (Supp. 1995).
110. Nonrecourse debt is secured by the property itself and foreclosure is the lender's
only remedy. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 953 (5th ed. 1979). No personal liability attaches
for the debt. Id.
111. See Wechsler, supra note 1, at 861.
112. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 7, § 8.3 n. 21, 23. See generally John Mixon,
Deficiency Judgments Following Home Mortgage Foreclosure:An Anachronism That Increases
PersonalTragedy, Impedes Regional Economic Recovery, and Means Little to Lenders,22 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 1 (1991).
113. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-729(A) (West 1990).
114. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580(d) (West 1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 61.24.100 (West Supp. 1996).
115. See, e.g., TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.003 (West Supp. 1995). This is also the
approach taken in the tentative draft of the Restatements. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROPERTY (MORTGAGES) § 8.4 (Tentative Draft No. 5, 1996). Under the Restatements
approach, the request for the use of the property's fair market value requires an affirmative
request by the borrower; otherwise the foreclosure bid price will be used to determine the

1996]

FORECLOSURELAW

Theoretically, anti-deficiency legislation should provide an incentive
to the lender to obtain the best price possible at the foreclosure sale.
Since the lender's recovery is limited to the proceeds received at the sale,
the lender will probably attempt to maximize the proceeds. However,
this incentive would only exist if the lender was prohibited from bidding
at the sale and purchasing the property. Prohibiting the lender from
bidding is inappropriate for the reasons more particularly discussed
above.16 Instead, a lender foreclosing in a state with anti-deficiency
legislation may be expected to ise the foreclosure sale merely as a
means to gain control of the property by credit bidding up to the
outstanding loan balance. The lender will then subsequently try to remarket the property to obtain its actual value. This inefficiency
associated with the necessity of two sales should, of itself cause concern
about the use of anti-deficiency legislation as a means to reform
foreclosure sales.
There are additional problems with anti-deficiency legislation.
Legislation of this type raises the cost of credit" 7 and generates moral
hazards."' Property owners whose property is fully leveraged would

deficiency. Id- The Restatement recognizes that a major restructuring of the foreclosure
process is desirable, but that it is more appropriate for the legislative domain than the
Restatement process. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (MORTGAGES) § 8.3 cmt.
a (Tentative Draft No. 5, 1996).
116. See supra p. 524.
117. See Meador, supra note 16, at 144. But see Mixon & Shepard, supra note 2, at 458
(arguing that deficiencies are irrelevant because collection costs seldom justify pursuit, and
pointing out that California home mortgage obligations, which are immune from deficiency,
pass without discount in the national market). A potential explanation why California
obligations pass without discount is that whatever increased risk associated with states having
anti-deficiency legislation is subsidized by mortgagors from other states who overpay in lending
costs. See Schill supra note 16, at 496-49. Mixon & Shepard further argue that the mortgage
insurance industry is a more efficient means to deal with deficiencies than personal liability
of the borrower. See Mixon & Shepard, supra note 2, at 484-85.
118. For a definition of "moral hazard," see Dorothy Golosinski and Douglas S. West,
Double Moral Hazardand Shopping Center Similarity in Canada,11 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 456,
456 (1995). Golosinski & West state that moral hazard is the "form of post-contractual opportunism that arises because actions that have efficiency consequences are not freely observable
and so the person taking them may choose to pursue his or her private interests at others'
expense." Id. Moral hazard problems arise in many market situations and within organizations as well. Id. See also Rocco Enterprises, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., 702 F. Supp.
596,601 n.4 (D. Va. 1988); Edgar Forster & Heinz Steinmuller, An Alternative View of Moral
Hazard,45 J. RISK & INS. 531 (1978) ("Moral hazard as a pattern of human behavior will arise
whenever the extent ... of a performance is partly or totally determined by the beneficiary,
whereas consideration... is not under the control of the party under obligation .... ). For
example, a moral hazard exists when an insured is tempted to "cash in" a policy in order to
capture a peak price.
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have little economic incentive to continue servicing the debt or
expending money to maintain and repair the property."9 In addition,
anti-deficiency legislation inappropriately shifts the risk of market
fluctuations from the owner to the lender, who must absorb losses but
forego gains in the value of the property. Efficiency and fairness dictate
that the fluctuation of value must remain with the borrower as owner.1" An illustration proves this point.
Assume that a lender lends $150,000 to one of its long and valued
customers. The customer pledges real property with a value of $100,000
as security for the loan. Ordinarily, the lender would not make this loan
given the inadequate value of the collateral; however, the lender does so
because of the long-standing relationship with the customer, the
customer's significant yearly income, and the customer's substantial net
worth evidenced by his savings accounts and stock portfolio. The
customer subsequently becomes disgruntled with the lender for other
reasons and quits servicing the $150,000 debt. Assume at the foreclosure
sale that the value of the pledged property has not changed and the
parties stipulate that its value is $100,000. Further assume that the
lender is the high bidder at the sale and actually bids in excess of the
value by submitting a $105,000 bid. Under these circumstances, there is
no compelling reason why the borrower should be protected from the
$45,000 deficiency.
The major weakness of anti-deficiency legislation as foreclosure law
reform, however, is that it does nothing to correct the lack of competitive
bidding at foreclosure sales. A borrower who has substantial equity in
her home will find little comfort in the knowledge that she is protected
from a deficiency judgment as she watches the lender bid the full
outstanding loan balance of $80,000 for property with a value of
$200,000. True, there is no deficiency, but there likewise is no surplus
in exchange for the borrower's equity. True competitive bidding would
increase the likelihood of a bid sufficient to generate a surplus above the
indebtedness, providing some value to the borrower in exchange for

119. See Mixon & Shepard, supranote 2, at 458 (acknowledging the possibility that "the
threat of deficiency liability is essential to keep home buyers from walking if the house values
drop below their loan balances," though the owners ultimately reject the argument as
unpersuasive).
120. For a contrary viewpoint, see Mixon & Shepard, supra note 2, at 483 (arguing that
shifting the risk of price declines to lenders makes sense as a matter of distributive justice, that
lenders already bear the unassignable risk of market decline, and that the elimination of
deficiencies would pressure lenders, who have far more information than borrowers, to look
more carefully at whether the mortgaged property is really worth the amount loaned).
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$120,000 of equity.
B. Statutory Redemption Legislation
The second major legislative means employed to address the
inadequacy of bid prices are statutory redemption laws.'
Presently,
about one half of the states have opted to provide the borrower with an
additional opportunity to statutorily redeem the property after the
foreclosure sale." The amount required to redeem is generally equal
to the high bid received at the sale, not the outstanding balance of the
indebtedness at the time of the sale." Like anti-deficiency legislation,
statutory redemption laws vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and may
only apply
to certain types of borrowers or certain methods of foreclo124
sure.
Theoretically, the statutory right of redemption would only be
exercised if and when the bid price received at the foreclosure sale was
less than the fair market value of the property sold. Consequently, as
the theory goes, the statutory right of redemption exerts upward pressure
on the bid price because the buyer would not want the borrower to
redeem the property." As the bid price approaches or surpasses the

121. Statutory redemption should not be confused with the equitable right of
redemption. "When courts utilize [equity of redemption] they are referring to the mortgagor's
right after default.., to perform his obligation under the mortgage and have the title restored
free and clear of the mortgage." See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 7, § 7.1. Statutory
redemption laws provide that, even after the equitable right of redemption has been
foreclosed, the borrower has one more opportunity to regain the property by paying the
purchaser at the foreclosure sale the price realized at such sale.
122. For a list of jurisdictions that have enacted some form of statutory redemption
legislation, see Mixon & Shepard, supra note 2, at 493 n.100. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT.
88 09.35.250, 09.45.190 (Michie 1994); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1282 (West 1990); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 18-49-106 (Michie 1987); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 716(e), 729.010-.090 (West
1982); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-38-301 (West Supp. 1995); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/151603 (West 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. § 628.28 (West Supp. 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2414
(1983); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 426.220 (Banks-Baldwin 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,
§ 6205 (West 1980); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.3140 (West 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN.
H8 580.23-.24 (West 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 443.410 (West Supp. 1986); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 71-1-228 (1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-5-18 to -21 (Michie 1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-1918 (1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 23.560 (1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-52-1 (Michie 1987);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 66-8-101, -102 (1996); UTAH CODE ANN. 69(0(3) (1988); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 6.23.020 (West 1995). See generally NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 7, § 8.4
(adding Alabama, Iowa, and Wyoming to the above list).
123. See generally LEFCOE, supra note 83, at 528-531.
124. See generally NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 7.
125. See Delta Savings & Loan Ass'n, Inc. v. I.R.S., 847 F.2d 248, 251 (5th Cir. 1988).
The court noted that the purpose of the federal redemption right in connection with foreclosed
tax liens is:
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value of the property, the borrower's incentive to redeem declines or is
eliminated.
As a practical matter, statutory redemption legislation has likely had
the opposite effect.126 Bidders, who may be willing to clear the other
hurdles of purchasing at foreclosures may be dissuaded from bidding by
the prospect of purchasing property that the borrower is able to redeem,
sometimes up to two years later. 27 In some situations, the defaulting
borrower is able to remain in possession of the property, rent free,
during the redemption period.1" Consequently, the purchaser must not
only endure the lack of return on its investment and the risk of market
declines during this period, but must rely on the defaulting borrower to
properly maintain and not abuse the property during the redemption
period. As a result, statutory redemption laws further reduce the little
incentive potential purchasers have to bid at foreclosure.
Statutory redemption does have one advantage over anti-deficiency
legislation. Statutory redemption legislation, at least theoretically,
protects equity. However, the value of this statutory redemption right
is questionable. The borrower, in order to redeem during the redemption period, typically must arrange to obtain funds equal to the bid

to encourage the lienholder to bid at least a fair price on the property being
foreclosed by allowing the government to redeem the property at the same price that
the lienholder pays for it (plus interest); ... if the lienholder pays less than a fair
price, the government in redeeming the property is able to capture any differential
between the price paid and the property's fair market value.
Id.
126. See Schill, supra note 16, at 534 (1991) Schill writes:
Although redemption rights permit borrowers to repurchase their property after
foreclosure .... such laws probably chill bidding at foreclosure sales. Third party
purchasers are unlikely to bid the fair market value of properties when they must
bear the risk that their purchase will be unraveled a year later. Laws that permit
mortgagors to remain in possession of the property during the redemption period
exacerbate the disincentives to purchase because they create a heightened risk of
waste.
kl
For a potential effect of statutory redemption laws on society at a whole, see Mixon &
Shepard, supra note 2, at 479-80 (stating that the combination of judicial foreclosure and
statutory redemption imposes a cost to lenders that will ultimately be reflected in higher priced
mortgage credit to consumers; repealing statutory redemption laws would theoretically benefit
the entire class of borrowers by reducing the price of borrowed funds).
127. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. §66-8-101 (1995) (allowing up to two years for
borrowers to exercise their statutory right of redemption).
128. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2414(a) (1981); Ropfogel v. Energren, 646 P.2d
1138, 1141 (1982). See also NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 7, § 8.4.
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amount (plus interest).129 Since the borrower defaulted to begin with,
it is reasonable to assume that he would not have the liquid funds
necessary to redeem the property. The borrower's ability to obtain a
loan may prove to be an insurmountable task given that the borrower's
credit history would now list a recent default and foreclosure.
Statutory redemption laws do not attempt to address the inadequate
bids received at far too many foreclosure sales. Because legislation
attempts to treat the low bid prices, without addressing their cause, this
type of legislation has largely failed. Statutory redemption proponents
fail to recognize that the process itself that causes a low bid price and
that such bids will continue to be the norm until the process is reformed
to interject true competitive bidding.
C. JudicialModels of Reform
Not surprising, with the inadequate response of state legislatures,
pressure to reform the foreclosure processes has also come through court
challenges to the process. 30 Until recently, one of the most effective
judicial challenges to the inadequacy of bid prices received at foreclosure
was in the Fifth Circuit decision of Durrett v. Washington National Life
Insurance.' In Durrett, the bankruptcy court voided a prepetition
foreclosure sale as a fraudulent transfer under section 548(a)(2) of the
Bankruptcy Code.' The Durrett court suggested that any foreclosure
and transfer of a debtor's interest in the real property for a bid price less

129. See, eg., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 426.220(1) (Banks-Baldwin 1991) ("If land sold
under execution does not bring two-thirds of its appraised value, the defendant and his
representatives may redeem it within a year from the day of sale, by paying the purchaser or
his representative the original purchase money and ten percent per annum interest thereon.").
130. See William H. Henning, An Analysis of Durrett and its Impact on Real and
PersonalPropertyForeclosures:Some ProposedModifications,63 N.C. L. REv. 257,273 (1985)
("There is no doubt but that Durrett is in part a reaction to the harsh nature of real property
foreclosure in this country.").
131. 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980).
132. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1994). The statute provides in pertinent part:
(a) The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debt or in property, or
any obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or within one
year before the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or
involuntarily(2)(A) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such
transfer or obligation; and
(B)(i) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such
obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such transfer or
obligation.
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than seventy percent of the property's fair value likely constituted a lack
of reasonably equivalent value.133 This permitted the estate in Durrett
to recover the property and capture the equity for the benefit of creditors.

134

The Supreme Court ultimately rejected the Durrett Rule in BFP v.
Resolution Trust Corp.35 In BFP, the Court held that a price received
at a regularly conducted noncollusive foreclosure sale is deemed to be
reasonably equivalent value for purposes of bankruptcy law,1regardless
36
of its relation to the actual fair market value of the property.
The Durrett Rule, in essence, was a judicially created form of
"statutory" redemption. The Durrett Rule permitted a debtor's
bankruptcy estate to redeem, even after the equitable right of redemption had been eliminated, any property sold at a foreclosure sale for less
than seventy percent of its fair value.
Durrett had certain advantages over state statutory redemption laws.
Like statutory redemption, Durrett could be used to protect the
borrower's equity in the property. However, a Durrett type redemption
could occur without the necessity of obtaining and paying funds to the
purchaser at the foreclosure sale.1 37 Redemption could be accomplished without any out-of-pocket expense simply by reinstating the
foreclosed lien. Furthermore, the period for redemption under Durrett
could be significantly longer than the time periods allowed under a
state's statutory redemption legislation. 38
The Durrett Rule had its flaws. The Durrett Rule was useful only
when the borrower whose property was foreclosed subsequently filed for
relief under the Bankruptcy Code. A borrower must also have been
insolvent at the time of the foreclosure, limitations not usually associated
with typical statutory redemption laws. This meant that only the equity
of insolvent borrowers could be protected. Other borrowers, who may
have comparable or more equity, but little debt other than that secured
by the property that was foreclosed, were unable to use the DurrettRule.
In addition, the Durrett Rule was no more effective in generating true
competitive bids than any other types of statutory redemption.
State courts also have a judicial distaste for the harsh impact of

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Durrett,621 F.2d at 203.
See 11 U.S.C. § 550 (1994).
114 S. Ct. 1757 (1994).
Id at 1758.
See 11 U.S.C. §8 548(c), 550(a) (1994).
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b), 548 (1994).
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foreclosure. A court's scrutiny of irregularities in the foreclosure process
intensifies when there is a large disparity between the bid price and the
market value of the property."9 In such circumstances, a court is more
likely to void the sale for perceived irregularities. The generally stated
rule is that mere inadequacy of the foreclosure sale price will not
invalidate a sale, absent fraud, unfairness, or other irregularity." °
However, there are several decisions which voided a sale based solely on
the unconscionability of a price inadequacy received at foreclosure. 4 '
Other courts have been troubled by foreclosures in which the lender
acquired the property only to resell it for a profit a short time thereafter. 4 2 As a remedy, the court may require the lender to return the
profit from the resale to the borrower.'43
Foreclosure sales have also been challenged based on the alleged
breach of an implied obligation of good faith.'" In Texas, this challenge was initially successful at the appellate level,4 but the Texas
Supreme Court'" ultimately determined that there did not exist a duty
of good faith and fair dealing in the realm of real property foreclo147 This holding was not without dissent by the Court, howevsures.
14
8

er.

139. See Johnson v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 429 P.2d 474 (Ariz. 1967). The
Johnson court set aside a foreclosure sale of property worth $73,000 that sold for the high bid
of $5,000 because deputy sheriff's failure to read the notice of sale at the county courthouse.
Id. Especially troubling to the court was the fact that the borrower arrived at the courthouse
eight minutes after the sale with an offer in excess of $56,000. IL See also NELSON &
WHITMAN, supra note 7, § 7.21.
140. See generally NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 7, § 7.21.
141. See, e.g., Gottlieb v. McCandle, 580 F. Supp. 1523 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Rife v.
Woolfolk, 289 S.E.2d 220 (W. Va 1982). See generally Harold C. Vaughan, Reform of
Mortgage Fore-closure Procedure-PossibilitiesSuggested by Honeyman v. Jacobs, 88 U. PA.
L. REV. 957 (1940).
142. See, e.g., Central Fin. Servs. v. Spears, 425 So. 2d 403 (Miss. 1983). The court in
Spears required the foreclosing lender, who purchased the property at the foreclosure sale for
$1,458 and then sold it less than two weeks later for $4,000, to account to the borrower for
the profit realized on the resale. Id.
143. Id. at 405.
144. See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Coleman, 762 S.W. 2d 243,245 (Tex. App. 1988),
rev'd by 795 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1990).
145. Id.
146. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Coleman, 795 S.W.2d at 706 (Tex. 1990).
147. Id. at 708.
148. Id. at 710.
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The Uniform Land Security Interest Act

The Uniform Land Security Interest Act (the "ULSIA") 149 evolved
from what was originally a more comprehensive act entitled the Uniform
Land Transactions Act (the "ULTA"). 50 The ULTA was drafted to
embrace the entire subject of land law in a single uniform statute. More
specifically, the ULTA was designed to emulate the benefits achieved in
the area of personal property with the Uniform Commercial Code. 5 '
No state ever adopted the ULTA,'5 ' and the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws determined that the adoption of
a single comprehensive real estate code by any state was unlikely
because of the substantial differences in the ways in which the various
states approached real property law.' 53
In 1985, the National Conference approved the ULSIA as a separate
act on security interests in land. However, like the ULTA, no state has
ever adopted the ULSIA. 154

The ULSIA would permit nonjudicial foreclosure of all security
1 56
interests 155 and eliminate any right of redemption after the sale.
The nonjudicial sale could be either a public sale or by private negotia"' but "every aspect of the sale, including the method, advertistions, 57
ing, time, place, and terms must be reasonable."' 58
The high bidder at the ULSIA foreclosure sale would, immediately
upon acceptance of the bid, deposit at least ten percent of the bid price
149. ULSIA § 7A U.L.A. 251 (Supp. 1996).
150. ULISA § 13 U.L.A. 469 (1986) (amended 1977).
151. See ULSIA, Prefatory Note, § 7A U.L.A. 251 (Supp. 1996) ("During the 1960's,
many lawyers and scholars came to recognize the substantial benefits which adoption of the

UCC provided in the field of personal property law. That recognition encouraged the
National Conference to consider how similar benefits might be realized in the field of real
property law.").
152. See Michael H. Schill, Uniformity or Diversity:Residential Real Estate Finance Law
in the 1990s and the Implicationsof ChangingFinancialMarkets, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261, 1279

(1991).
153. See ULSIA, Prefatory Note, § 7A U.L.A. 252 (Supp. 1996) ("[B]ecause of the
complexity of the field and because the states treated various aspects of real estate law in
substantially different ways, it appeared unlikely that any state would enact a single comprehensive real estate code.")
154. See Julia Patterson Forrester, A Uniform and More Rational Approach for Rents
As Security for the Mortgage Loan, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 349, 423 n.286 (1993).
155. See ULSIA § 509 (a), 7A U.L.A. 292 (Supp 1996).
156. See ULSIA § 513 cmt 1, § 7A U.L.A. 297 (Supp. 1996) ("Under this Act there is
no right of redemption after sale.").
157. See ULSIA § 509, § 7A U.L.A. 292 (Supp. 1996).
158. Id.
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in cash. 59 The high bidder would then be allowed five weeks to
complete the transaction." 6 The high bidder would presumably use
this time to arrange financing. If the high bidder failed to complete the
transaction, the contract could be specifically enforced against the bidder,
or the deposit could be retained as liquidated damages.'6 '
Unfortunately, the primary motivation behind the ULSIA was
perceived to be the improvement of the collection process available to
lenders holding defaulted mortgages. 62 In the words of the National
Conference, the major policy decision underpinning the act was the need
to "reduce the 'cost' of foreclosure."'" In the Prefatory Note to the
ULSIA, the National Conference further stressed that the ULSIA would
provide the "availability of a uniform, less expensive, and more
expeditious foreclosure procedure [and] would facilitate the sale and
resale of secured real estate loans."' 64
Viewing the ULSIA from this perspective, the proposed reform
appears to be but another skirmish in the ongoing battle for power
between the lender and borrower. This language seems to suggest that
the ULSIA represents an attempt to swing the pendulum back in the
direction of lenders. It also suggests that foreclosure reform must always
come at the expense of one of the parties, a depiction of foreclosure law
that this Article rejects. Consequently, the ULSIA has been ineffective
in accomplishing its goal of revising the present foreclosure laws. Many
of the ideas presented in the ULSIA are worthy of more consideration,
and the proposed model set forth in the next section of the Article draws
heavily from the ULSIA.
IV.

REJECTION OF THE ZERO-SUM LEGISLATIVE MODEL: A NEW
Focus ON THE PROCESS OF FORECLOSURE

Every jurisdiction has now had sufficient experience with its real
property foreclosure laws to realize that their current methods are
inadequate to generate sufficient proceeds to protect either the borrower
or the lender. A cabal of commentators have roundly criticized present
159. Id.at 293.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See Roger Bernhardt, ULSIA's Remedies on Default-Worth the Effort?, 24 CONN.
L. REV. 1001, 1005 (1992).
163. See ULSIA § 503, cmt 1, 7A U.L.A. 284 (Supp. 1996).
164. ULSIA, 7A U.L.A. 253 (Supp 1996). It was the Commissioner's belief that "delays
in completing real estate foreclosures.., increased the risks of vandalism, fire loss,
depreciation, damage and waste." Id.
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foreclosure models, offering various suggestions for reform."6 Past
attempts to address the problem through anti-deficiency or statutory
redemption-type legislation have proved ineffective, largely because they
minimize the effect and not the cause of inefficient and inequitable
foreclosure models. To the extent states are actually concerned about
real property sales being conducted in a manner that will generate
reasonable bids, their current foreclosure process must be revised to
address the causes of the low bids obtained at foreclosure sales and not
merely the symptom.
Under the foreclosure model proposed in this article, a lender has
three options from which to select in disposing of the property upon the
default of a borrower. A lender may choose one of the following:
1. A lender may retain the property in full satisfaction of the
debt after notice to and lack of objection from the borrower '66
and all parties holding junior interests that have notified the
lender of the existence of such interest, or
2. A lender may repossess and sell the property in a "commercially reasonable manner,'' 167 or
3. A lender may sell the property pursuant to a "safe-harbor"
procedure, a method by which a lender is deemed to have
sold the property in a commercially reasonable manner if the
lender follows a regimented list of procedures described
below."
In developing the model foreclosure process described in this Article,
consideration was given to one of the primary benefits of the present
system from a lender's perspective; the current system provides the
lender with a great deal of certainty. Merely conduct the sale in a
noncollusive regularly conducted manner according to state law and the
lender faces little risk of the sale being successfully attacked. 69

165. See, e.g., Alex M. Johnson, Critiquing the Foreclosure Process: An Economic
Approach Based on the ParadigmaticNorms of Bankruptcy, 79 VA. L. REv. 959 (1993); Grant
S. Nelson, Deficiency Judgments After Real Estate Foreclosures in Missouri"Some Modest
Proposals,47 Mo. L. REv. 151 (1982); Wechsler, supra note 1, at 850.
166. For the counterpart of permitting lenders to retain property in satisfaction of the
debt in the area of personal property, see U.C.C. § 9-505 (1985).
167. For the commercially reasonable sale counterpart in the area of personal property,
see U.C.C. § 9-504.
168. See infra notes 185-89.
169. The price received at a foreclosure sale constitutes reasonable equivalent value for
purposes of the Bankruptcy Code "so long as all the requirements of the State's foreclosure
law have been complied with." BFP v. Resolution Trust Corporation, 114 S. Ct. 1757, 1765
(1994). When the state foreclosure procedures have been followed, the mere inadequacy of
the foreclosure sale price is no basis for setting the sale aside. GEORGE E. OSBORNE, ET. AL.,
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However, this certainty under the current foreclosure methods comes at
a cost: low bids at foreclosure sales. The model proposed in this article
retains this benefit of certainty for the lender, but only if the lender
elects to foreclose pursuant to the safe-harbor option.
Lenders that operate in jurisdictions permitting nonjudicial foreclosure 170 also recognize that in addition to certainty, current foreclosure
law in those jurisdictions provides a relatively quick and inexpensive
means of foreclosing. The proposed model retains this benefit for
lenders as well. In fact, under some circumstances, i.e., the lender elects
to retain the property in satisfaction of the indebtedness and forego a
deficiency, the foreclosure process is quicker and cheaper. Foreclosure
under the proposed model will be much quicker in those jurisdictions
that do not presently permit nonjudicial foreclosure.'17 The remainder
of this section explores in more detail each of the proposed options
available to lenders.
A. Option One: Property in Satisfaction of Debt
The first option allows a lender to retain the mortgaged property in
full satisfaction of the indebtedness. This is akin to strict foreclosure,"
and if exercised without objection, would vest both legal and equitable
title in the lender. Unlike the original strict foreclosure, this option is
available to a lender only in those circumstances in which a borrower or
certain junior interest holders do not object. Presumably, either a
borrower or a junior lien holder would object any time the value of the
mortgaged property exceeded the outstanding balance of debt secured
by the lien being foreclosed. Thus, this would be a viable option only
where a borrower had very little or no equity in the property.
Pursuant to the strict foreclosure component of the proposed model,
a lender may not elect this option until after default and acceleration of
the indebtedness secured by the property. If the lender elects, the lender
would send personal notice of its election to the borrower and all other
parties that have previously notified the foreclosing lender of their
interest in the property. Notice to senior interest holders would not be
§ 7.16 (1st ed. 1979).
170. There are over 30 jurisdictions in which power of sale foreclosure is authorized and
used. Seesupra note 82. See also Jack Jones & J. Michael Ivens, Power of Sale Foreclosure
in Tennessee: A Section 1983 Trap, 51 TENN. L. REV. 279, 293-94 (1984).
171. Judicial foreclosure is exclusively or generally used in 24 states. See Osborne, et.
al., supra note 169, § 7.11. All jurisdictions allow judicial foreclosure, but it typically is not
used in those that also permit nonjudicial foreclosure.
172. For a description of strict foreclosure, see supra note 66.
REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW
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required because their interest would be unaffected by the "foreclosure
in satisfaction of indebtedness" proposed by the lender."
Junior interest holders would be entitled to notice only if they have
notified the foreclosing lienholder. It is not unreasonable to require the
junior interest holder to bear the burden of notifying the senior, since in
all likelihood the junior would have searched the title and become aware
of the senior when the junior acquired its interest. Assigning this burden
to the junior interest holder should make the process quicker and less
expensive, as the foreclosing lender would not be required to search title
before making the proposal. This approach will also promote efficiency
and cost effectiveness concerns. In the majority of situations, a
foreclosing lienholder, even if required to spend the time and resources
to search the title, would likely discover that the time and money was
spent only to learn that there are no junior interest holders.
Depending on whether the jurisdiction presently requires personal
notice to junior interest holders, a foreclosure process that permits the
lender to retain the property in satisfaction of the debt under the
parameters outlined may provide more or less protection than junior
interest holders currently enjoy. Not all jurisdictions require such
notice. 4 In those jurisdictions, by notifying the senior lender, junior
interest holders can obtain notice much more easily and less expensively
than they could if they monitored pastings and publications.
Because of the proposed statutory impact of a deed in satisfaction of
the indebtedness, it is important to require a foreclosing lender that
intends to retain the property to notify junior interest holders. The
foreclosing lender's acceptance of such a deed would eliminate all liens
or encumbrances subsequent to the time the lender perfected the lien

being foreclosed. Eliminating junior interests is precisely what happens
under current foreclosure law, 5 after the lender has borne the expense
173. The model foreclosure statute would need to address the interaction of a
foreclosure and its effect on any due-on-sale clause contained in senior lien documents, by
providing that due-on-sale clauses are unenforceable under such circumstances.
174. See, e.g., TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002(b) (West 1995). The statute provides in
pertinent part:
(b) Notice of the sale, which must include a statement of the earliest time at which
the sale will begin, must be given at least 21 days before the date of the sale: ...
(3) by the holder of the debt to which the power of sale is related serving
written notice of the sale by certified mail on each debtor who, according to the
records of the holder of the debt, is obligated to pay the debt.
Id. (emphasis added).
175. The title conveyed to the foreclosure sale purchaser is the same title to the land as
that possessed by the borrower when the foreclosed mortgage was executed. See Motel Enter.
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of conducting the foreclosure. There is no reason not to extend this
same effect to a process that can be more efficient, expeditious, and less
adversarial to all parties involved. Unless junior interests are eliminated,
the lender would never consider accepting a deed in satisfaction of the
indebtedness when there are junior liens or encumbrances. Thus, the
potential benefit of this option would be lost.
In order to keep land records in proper order for subsequent parties,
the deed accepted in satisfaction of the indebtedness need only recite
that the transfer was pursuant to the model foreclosure statute and that
all other interests in the property acquired after the date of the grant of
the lien are extinguished thereby.
Many of the benefits of allowing the lender to retain the property in
satisfaction of the indebtedness have already been mentioned. The
primary benefit is a quicker and less expensive foreclosure process. The
time and cost saving advantages alone are enough to justify the process
and may be sufficient to entice a lender to select this option and forego
any potential deficiency, thereby also benefitting the borrower. The
process may also turn out to be a less adversarial means of foreclosing,
perhaps even fostering a somewhat strained spirit of cooperation
between borrowers and lenders under trying circumstances. This spirit
of cooperation may manifest itself through agreements regarding the
date of possession of the property, communication of information
regarding the property, and the elimination of any need for judicial
resources to enforce the transfer of possession. 76
Foreclosing by retaining the property in satisfaction of the debt would
only be available to the lender in the event that neither the borrower nor
any junior interest holder entitled to notice objected. In the event an
interest holder did object, the lender must forego option one and select
one of the other two options available."
The only time a party

v. Nobani, 784 S.W.2d 545, 547 (Tex. App. 1990) (foreclosure sale passes "all right, title, and
interest that the mortgagor held at the time the deed of trust was executed, free and clear of
the rights of any subsequent purchaser."). In the event the foreclosing lender neglects to join
a junior interest holder in a judicial foreclosure, or neglects to provide notice if required in a
power of sale state, the junior interest may survive the foreclosure until the foreclosing lender
takes corrective action. See generally NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 7, § 7.15.
176. A defaulting borrower may refuse to relinquish possession of the property after
foreclosure. A property owner who remains in possession of the premises after a lawful
foreclosure becomes a tenant at sufferance and is subject to summary dispossession by the
purchaser at the foreclosure sale. See California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Day, 388 S.E.2d
727, 728 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989).
177. In preparing the proposal, consideration was given to requiring the junior interest
holder to pay the first lien in order to object the senior lender's proposal. This was rejected
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should rationally object would be when the party believed the property
has a value in excess of the indebtedness it secured.'78
The time period permitted for objection should be short-no more
than twenty days. As the length of time to object to the proposal
increases, the lender's incentive to capitalize on the quick and inexpensive features of this option will diminish. Though at first blush twenty
days may seem extremely short, consider that the borrower has been
aware of the possibility of foreclosure for some time. There will always
be a period of time after default before the lender sends a notice of
default and notice of intent to accelerate to the borrower, and an
additional period of time after the notice of intent to accelerate and the
actual acceleration of the indebtedness. Since the model foreclosure
statute only permits the lender to make the proposal after default and
acceleration, a short period of twenty days (during which the borrower
must object or be deemed to have accepted the proposal) is not
unreasonable.
The short time period may somewhat burden junior interest holders,
especially since they may not have been aware of the default and
acceleration process. These interest holders are generally less emotionally involved, however, and should be able to make a rational decision
within the relatively short twenty day period.
The option of retaining the property in satisfaction of the indebtedness does not produce true competitive bidding. Likewise, it does not
result in higher bid prices directly, because, technically, there would not
be an actual foreclosure "sale" unless one views the property as having

because the junior interest holder may not be in a financial position to allow the junior to
protect its equity by paying off the senior lien. Likewise, relying on the borrower to object
to the senior lender's proposal when there is value in the property above the senior lien may
not fully protect the junior interest holder. Even though there may be significant value above
the senior debt, from the borrower's perspective there would not be any equity in cases where
the sum of the outstanding indebtedness exceeded the value of the property. In such
situations, the borrower should still rationally object to the proposal so that the surplus above
the senior debt can be applied to reduce her indebtedness to her junior creditors, thereby
avoiding or reducing deficiencies. Nonetheless, the junior interest holder should not be left at
the mercy of the borrower making a prudent objection.
178. In any situation in which the property value is less than the outstanding
indebtedness secured by the lien being foreclosed, the borrower has no economic incentive to
object, and in fact has an incentive to accept the proposal in order to avoid a deficiency by the
foreclosing lender. Junior interest holders likewise have no incentive to object under such
circumstances because all proceeds from the foreclosure will go to the senior lender. Not
objecting assures the junior interest holder that the senior, who has foregone a deficiency, will
not be competing with the junior interest holder for a portion of any of the borrower's
remaining assets.
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been sold to the lender for an amount equal to the outstanding
indebtedness. In actuality, however, a foreclosure sale at a price equal
to the amount of the indebtedness is precisely what it is, and since,
presumably, a borrower will only acquiesce in the lender's selection of
this option when there is no equity in the property, obtaining a "bid"
price equal to the debt is the most favorable treatment that a borrower
can reasonably expect. Consequently, the goal of obtaining higher "bid"
prices is accomplished.
Jurisdictions that have anti-deficiency legislation may insist their
legislation already provides the same effect. However, there are some
key distinctions between anti-deficiency legislation and allowing a lender
the option of retaining the property in satisfaction of the indebtedness.
First, this is an option a lender may elect if the borrower does not
object. It is not forced on the lender. A lender remains entitled to
foreclose under one of the other two methods and pursue a deficiency
against the borrower if the lender feels such a course is justified.
Allowing a lender to choose whether to propose retaining the
property in satisfaction of the debt leaves the risk of decline if the values
on the borrower, as it should be. The borrower, the owner of the
property, obviously expects to maintain any appreciation in value of the
property in the event values increase and the risk of decline should
likewise remain on the borrower. It is difficult to justify requiring a
lender to absorb losses but deny the lender gains. Anti-deficiency
legislation in essence requires lenders to function as guarantors that the
value of the property will not decline below a certain amount, i.e., the
outstanding loan balance. In the event the value does decline below
such an amount, the lender, by being forced to forego the deficiency, is
required to purchase the property itself for the outstanding loan balance.
In other words, under anti-deficiency legislation, the lender must
"subsidize" the borrower's bad decision if the property value declines.
Second, anti-deficiency legislation does not provide the time and expense
savings associated with the option of retaining the property in satisfaction
of the debt. Anti-deficiency legislation does not eliminate the need to
complete the foreclosure proceedings, but only provides that the lender
must accept whatever proceeds are received at such sale in full satisfaction of its debt-after the lender has incurred the time and expense of
foreclosing.
Anti-deficiency legislation is also less protective of the borrower that
has significant equity in the property. Though such a borrower cannot
be held liable for a deficiency regardless of the price received at
foreclosure, this is little comfort to a borrower that watches as a $200,000
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home is sold for the $100,000 loan balance because of an inefficient
foreclosure process. If the lender proposed retaining the property in
satisfaction of the debt when the borrower has significant equity, the
borrower would presumably object to the proposal and require that the
property be disposed of pursuant to one of the other two options under
the foreclosure model proposed in the article. These other options, the
"commercially reasonable" or "safe harbor" means of foreclosing, should
be much more effective than current foreclosure models at generating
adequate proceeds and protecting the equity below. These "excess"
proceeds over the loan balance amount belong the borrower.
A borrower and lender could agree, even under current foreclosure
laws, to a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure. This could potentially produce
time and expense savings, but would be a viable option only if there are
no intervening interests. The borrower, however, has little incentive to
agree to a deed-in-lieu if the borrower is in a jurisdiction that has
enacted anti-deficiency legislation. Since the borrower knows she would
be protected by the anti-deficiency legislation, the worst that could
happen to the borrower is the loss of the property. From an economic
perspective, it would be in the borrower's interest to drag out the
foreclosure as long as possible (increasing the lender's expenditure of
money and time), while at the same time spending as little money as
possible maintaining the property (driving down the property's value
even more, but whose cost is borne solely by the lender who must forego
any deficiency). Likewise, a lender concerned about the risk of missing
intervening interests has little or no incentive to agree to accept a
voluntary deed-in-lieu of foreclosure, especially when the property has
actually been further encumbered.
B.

Option Two: Commercially Reasonable Foreclosure Sale Standard
The second option under the proposed model foreclosure statute
requires that the lender dispose of the property in a commercially
reasonable manner.179 This is the "baseline" means for a lender's

179. In 1987, Illinois enacted a new mortgage foreclosure law, applicable to all
foreclosures commenced after July, 1987. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/15-1101 to 15-1706
(West 1992). The Illinois act was enacted with the goal of increasing foreclosure sale prices,
and provides a great deal of flexibility to the courts in determining the process of foreclosure
sales.
Among other things, many of the deficiencies of other states' foreclosure processes
regarding the notice of sale have been addressed by Illinois law, which requires nine specific
categories of information to be contained in each notice of sale. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/15-1507 (West 1992). Among them are the name, address, and telephone number of an
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disposal of real property collateral and provides the lender with a great
deal of flexibility as to how it disposes of the collateral.
Obviously, this option also draws heavily from the area of personal
property and the Uniform Commercial Code, which mandates that
personal property pledged as collateral be sold or disposed of in a
commercially reasonable manner." Adopting this same standard for
lender's disposing of real property pledged as collateral has several
benefits.
Foreclosure sales should be designed to result in higher bid prices;
bid prices that hopefully approach the actual fair market value of the
property sold. Of course, the generation of fair market value bids is
premised on the assumption that property marketed in a commercially
reasonable manner will bring its fair market value. Though this may not
always be the case, it is the assumption that our economy is based on.
Moreover, such a process more closely approximates market value than
its competitor models. Higher bid prices benefit not only a borrower by
either preserving the equity or reducing the deficiency, but also benefit
the lender by allowing the lender to either be repaid in full from the sale
or by decreasing the deficiency amount.
Furthermore, a commercially reasonable sale should result in selling
the property to a purchaser that actually wants the property. Very few
lenders, at least institutional lenders, actually want the property they
purchase at foreclosure sales. The lender merely credit bids and
purchases at the sale so that it can gain control of the property to
dispose of it in a more realistic manner at a later date, i.e, in a "commer-

information contact person, the common address and any other non-legal description of the
property, a description of any improvements on the property, and the requirement of a nonlegal advertisement in the section of the newspaper that contains other real estate advertising
unconnected with legal proceedings. Id.
Illinois law also requires that the advertisement contain information regarding when the
property would be available for inspection, but it is unclear what would happen if the
mortgagor, who remains in possession of the property pending foreclosure, refuses to permit
the inspection. Id. The sale process itself is not limited to public auctions, and if directed by
the court, the property may be sold through the use of brokers. Id.
Many of the provisions of the Illinois statute are directed towards the theme of selling the
property in a "commercially reasonable manner," but the Illinois law imposes the duty on the
court to determine what is "commercially reasonable," as opposed to requiring the lender to
dispose of the property in such a fashion. It is questionable whether the courts have either
the time or expertise to make this determination. The Illinois statute also rejects the concept
of nonjudicial foreclosures, and retains the prospect of statutory redemption. See generally
Eric T. Freyfogle, The New JudicialRoles in Illinois Mortgage Foreclosures,19 LOY. U. CHI.

L. J. 933 (1988).
180. See U.C.C. § 9-504 (1985).
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cially reasonable manner." It is not anticipated that the lender's bid at
the foreclosure sale would be indicative of the property's value, but the
bid only serves to allow the lender to gain control of the property for
proper marketing.
The current foreclosure models are inefficient and unproductive
because they foster the purchase of unwanted property by lenders
seeking to gain control. Moreover, many lenders are not adept at selling
this "repossessed" property and the property languishes for months while
the lender makes arrangements to dispose of it in a reasonable manner.
In addition to the carrying and lost opportunity costs incurred by a
lender during this time period, the property's fair market value often
declines between the time of the foreclosure sale and the "true" sale of
the property. These costs are in addition to the actual transaction costs
associated with the necessity of a foreclosing lender conducting two sales.
The double transaction costs associated with two sales can be avoided
by conducting a commercially reasonable sale in the first instance,
resulting in both cost and time savings. Finally, the perception of the
public, especially the perception of a borrower whose property is being
foreclosed, should be improved. No one wants to see anyone's property
lost at foreclosure, but obviously it seems imminently more fair, and will
be perceived as such, if all parties believe that the property has been sold
at foreclosure in a reasonable manner. This is the case especially if the
price received at the foreclosure sale is comparable to the property's
actual value.
Requiring the sale of property in a commercially reasonable manner
is not without its own set of problems. These problems include the
debtors' loss of possession before its actual sale and the lenders' loss of
the certainty currently enjoyed regarding the means of conducting a
foreclosure sale.
Selling property in a commercially reasonable manner will almost
always require the borrower to lose possession before the foreclosure
sale. Requiring a lender to conduct a commercially reasonable sale
dictates that the lender be given the opportunity to do so. 181 To assure
that a lender has such an opportunity, it is obviously necessary that the
181. The repossessing lender is much better positioned than a defaulting borrower to do
what is necessary to sell the property at the highest possible price under the circumstances.
While the lender may not be thoroughly familiar with the particular real estate market
involved, the lender has the financial resources and knowledge to consult with the borrower,
real estate agents, and others in the industry to determine the best means for advertising the
property and selecting the method of sale. If necessary, the lender has the cash to clean, paint,
repair, or otherwise prepare the property for sale.
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lender have sufficient control over the property to be sold. This will
necessitate the lender evicting the borrower before the sale-in essence
repossessing the collateral. This control before sale is necessary to
enable the lender to make needed repairs1" and have the property
available for inspection. It is unrealistic to expect any potential bidder
to offer a price close to the property's value if the bidder has been
denied the opportunity to inspect the property before its bid. Allowing
the lender to evict and repossess before the sale may be detrimental to
borrowers who currently may remain in the property until after
foreclosure. It is necessary, nonetheless, in order to allow the lender to
sell in a commercially reasonable manner.1" The detriment to the
borrower is offset by the benefits of such inspection and sale and by the
accompanying higher bid prices that should follow.
The second concern associated with imposing a commercially
reasonable standard is the lender's loss of certainty regarding the
procedures to sell real property at foreclosure. The requirement of
selling property in a "commercially reasonable manner" raises the
question of precisely what is required to be "commercially reasonable."
It is a standard that, especially in the early years, may subject lenders to
litigation challenging the method of sale.
However, this fear of challenge to the revised method should not
serve as justification to continue foreclosure methods that have proven
to be flawed and ineffective at generating adequate bids. One must also
realize that requiring lenders to dispose of personal property held as
182. The commercially reasonable standard in the personal property arena may impose
a duty on the lender to repair the collateral prior to sale. See Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.
v. Acme Tool Div. of the Rucker Co., 540 F.2d 1375, 1381 (10th Cir. 1976) (affirming that the
failure to clean and paint a drilling rig did not conform to reasonable commercial practices
among oil field equipment dealers). See also Credit Alliance Corp. v. Timmco Equip., 507 So.
2d 657 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that where lender sold fire-damaged equipment to
itself without making any effort to repair the equipment before the sale, and then later resold
the equipment for three times the amount paid, the sale of the collateral was commercially
unreasonable because the sale price was unfair and could have been raised by repairing the
collateral prior to the sale).
183. Notwithstanding the loss of possession, borrowers would retain their equitable right
of redemption to foreclosure. The disadvantage of the borrower's loss of possession before
foreclosure can best be addressed by requiring more time between a required notice of default
and acceleration of the indebtedness for residential borrowers. This notice period would allow
defaulting borrowers a comparable opportunity to stave off the foreclosure that allowing them
to remain in possession until foreclosure currently does. It also eliminates the detriments of
depriving the lender of an opportunity to prepare the property for sale and denying potential
bidders the opportunity to inspect. It further eliminates the risk of the foreclosure sale buyer
being unable to obtain immediate possession after the sale, all of which could significantly
depress bid prices.
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collateral has neither deterred lenders from making this type of
collateralized loan, nor resulted in undue hardships to the lender.
Furthermore, lenders can hire experts to help establish what it means to
be "commercially reasonable," and can consult a rich history of personal
property sales and case law to delineate what constitutes a commercially
reasonable sale. Finally, the standard of what constitutes a "commercially reasonable" sale of real property in any given locale will become
clearer over time, as the court system challenges and addresses such
sales.
Furthermore, if the "commercially reasonable sale" is successful in
generating bids approximating the fair market value of the property sold,
then the risk of "blackmail" type litigation would be rather minimal."s
The penalty for a lender's failure to conduct a commercially reasonable
sale would be to hold the lender liable for the difference between what
the property would have brought if sold in a commercially reasonable
manner (presumably, the fair market value of the property) and the price
actually received. Only in situations where there is a large discrepancy
between the fair market value and the foreclosure price obtained at the
sale would there be much of an economic incentive to challenge the sale,
and even then the lender may successfully defend by proving the sale
was indeed conducted in a "commercially reasonable" fashion.
Nonetheless, any lender wishing to maintain absolute certainty and
avoid even the possibility of litigation as to whether the sale was
conducted in a "commercially reasonable manner," may do so by
foreclosing pursuant to the "safe harbor" method described below. Any
lender electing to foreclose pursuant to this method will be deemed, as
a matter of law, to have foreclosed its lien in a "commercially reasonable
manner."
C Option Three: Safe HarborForeclosure
In order to come within the ambit of a safe harbor foreclosure, the
lender is required to provide a minimal amount of information regarding
three aspects of the property being sold at foreclosure:
(1) the availability of the property,

184. When a very low price is received in a personal property sale relative to the
collateral's appraised value, courts will closely scrutinize the sale and require the secured party
to provide an explanation. See Bank Josephine v. Conn, 599 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Ky. Ct. App.
1980) (holding that in connection with a personal property sale, a wide disparity between the
price received at the foreclosure sale and the subsequent resale price raises a presumption that
the foreclosure sale was not commercially reasonable).
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(2) the physical condition of the property, and
(3) the legal title to the property.
In addition, any foreclosure under this option would provide that bidders
at the foreclosure sale will have financing available to them up to an
amount equal to eighty percent of the bid price.
1. Information Regarding the Availability of the Property
One problem in generating true competitive bidding is the lack of
sufficient numbers of interested bidders present at the sale. Though this
lack of bidders can be attributed to many reasons, one such reason is
that many otherwise potentially interested bidders are never informed
that the property is even being sold. The typical means of informing the
general public consists of posting a legal notice in a specified location at
the courthouse,185 or, perhaps, advertising the property by its legal
description in either a legal newspaper or the legal section of the local
paper.'86 The sale is then conducted at the courthouse steps.'7
The safe harbor method would require that the lender notify
prospective bidders by (1) placing a sign in the front yard of the
property, specifying the date, time, and place of the sale, and (2) by
placing an advertisement in the appropriate real estate section of a local
general circulation newspaper. The advertisement must be placed in the
newspaper no less than the three weekends immediately preceding the
sale, which would be conducted on the premises of the property being
sold. The lender would be required to include in each advertisement of
the property the common street address of the property, in addition to
the date, time, and place of the sale. In addition, the advertisement must
specify when the property is available for inspection, as well as provide
a phone number to call for additional information.
2. Information Regarding the Physical Condition of the Property
In order to allow prospective bidders to garner information concerning the physical condition of the property, the lender is required to make
the property available for inspection by prospective bidders. In addition,
185. See, e.g., TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002 (West 1995).
186. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE §2924f (West Supp. 1996) (requiring, where possible, the
publication of the foreclosure notice in a paper of general circulation published in the city or
judicial district in which the property, or some part of it, is located.) One commentator has
noted that, from the lender's perspective, the most attractive "general circulation" paper in
which to place the notice is presumably the one with the fewest subscribers because it likely
has lower adverting rates. See Johnson, supra note 165.
187. See, e.g., TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002 (West 1995).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:77

prospective bidders are provided an opportunity to have a professional
inspect the property, at their expense, if the bidder so desired.
3. Information Regarding the Legal Title to the Property
Before the foreclosure sale under the safe harbor method, the lender
must order a title search and make a title commitment available for
prospective bidders. Furthermore, and as part of the expense of the
foreclosure sale, the lender must provide the high bidder with a title
insurance policy consistent with the matters set forth in the title
commitment.
Key information on legal title to the property allows bidders to bid
at the sale with assurance of the status of title being acquired. Though
each bidder could obtain their own title insurance commitment
individually, it is more efficient to have the lender provide this service.
4. Availability of Credit
Any lender electing to foreclose pursuant to the safe harbor method,
must, in addition to providing the information discussed above, advertise
that up to 80% financing of the bid price would be available to the high
bidder at the foreclosure sale. This requires that the lender, in order to
gain the certainty of the safe harbor method of foreclosure, allow the
high bidder to assume a portion of the outstanding indebtedness owed
to the lender. The foreclosing lender is not required to extend additional
funds, and in fact, would always have its indebtedness reduced by the
amount of the purchaser's down payment. In the event the balance of
the remaining outstanding indebtedness was less than 80% of the bid
price, the final portion of the financing would be provided by the
borrower accepting a second lien note and mortgage.
The credit made available to the bidders would be in the form of a
fixed rate mortgage, amortized over a level payment period of twenty
years. The interest rate would be tied to a widely published index (such
as the 11th District Cost of Funds) as reported in the Wall Street Journal
and set as of the first date of notice of the sale.
D. Illustrations Under the Proposed Model

This section sets forth several illustrations of the various scenarios
comprising the relationship of the debt to the value of the property, as
well as the debt in relation to the bid. These examples provide a clear
explanation of how the eighty percent financing for high bidders
operates.
To illustrate the mechanics of the model proposed in the article, I
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have provided four different scenarios. In examples one and two, the
outstanding indebtedness is greater than the value of the property
securing the debt. In other words, there is no equity in the property for
the borrower. I adjust the hypothetical bid received at the foreclosure
sale between the two examples, so that in one situation the bid is less
than the debt, and in the other example, the bid is greater than the debt.
In examples three and four, the outstanding indebtedness is less than the
value of the property and reflects the equity in the property. Again, I
adjust the hypothetical bid price between examples three and four so
that in one situation the bid is less than the debt, and in the other, the
bid is greater than the debt. In each of the scenarios, I have assumed
that the fair market value of the home is $100,000.
Example One: Debt higher than the value; high bid less than the
debt.
Value of property:
$100,000
Outstanding debt:
120,000
High Bid:
90,000
Financing Available:
72,000
In example one, the high bid submitted at the foreclosure sale, even
though reasonable in relation to the value of the property, is still $30,000
less than necessary to pay the outstanding indebtedness. This $30,000
will constitute the amount for which a lender may seek a deficiency
judgment.
Since the lender has chosen to foreclose pursuant to the safe harbor
method, the lender was required to advertise that the property was being
sold with eighty percent financing guaranteed to the high bidder. Thus,
a high bidder willing to bid $90,000 was assured of at least $72,000 in
financing, and was, therefore, able to submit the $90,000 bid so long as
the bidder had the other twenty percent of the bid price available in
cash. In this instance, the twenty percent amounts to $18,000, which
would be delivered to the lender by the high bidder, together with the
high bidder's note and mortgage for the remaining $72,000. If the lender
is able to collect the $30,000 deficiency, the lender will be repaid in full;
the original borrower will face a smaller deficiency to the extent that the
available financing encouraged a higher bid than otherwise would have
been received, and the high bidder has become the owner of a $100,000
home for a down payment of $18,000 and a promise to pay an additional
$72,000.
Under this scenario, the lender is able to dispose of the property in
a manner that provides it with the certainty it desires. Moreover, the
lender has not had to come out of pocket to provide more financing than
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originally extended to the borrower. Even though the lender has not yet
been repaid in full, the lender has immediately received an $18,000
reduction in its exposure, together with a promissory note and lien from
the high bidder. This high bidder obviously has enough confidence in its
ability to service the debt, or would not have put at risk their down
payment of $18,000. If the high bidder does default, the lender can
foreclose on the new $72,000 mortgage and the $28,000 equity between
the $100,000 value of the house and the $72,000 mortgage should assure
the lender that it can recoup its expenses and be paid in full.
If the lender no longer wants to carry any portion of the property's
debt, the lender may choose the safe harbor method of foreclosure in
order to obtain the desired level of certL_.ity. The lender would then be
free to bid at the foreclosure sale and continue to increase its bid until
the lender itself is either the high bidder or the third party bidder's
twenty percent down payment has increased to the point that the lender
is willing to accept the twenty percent and carry the remainder.
Example Two: Debt higher than value, high bid more than debt.
Value of property:
$100,000
Outstanding debt:
120,000
High bid:
130,000
Financing Available:
104,000
(94,000 from lender)
(10,000 from borrower)
Example two depicts a situation in which the debt is again higher
than the value of the property, but in this situation the bid received is
more than the debt. This would be a highly unusual situation, since most
purchasers would be unwilling to pay more for the property than the
property's value. The bidder, however, may have her own reasons for
valuing the property higher, and the lender, faced with this determined
bidder, may have continued to credit bid up to the amount of its debt.
In this situation, the high bidder will need to have funds available in
the amount of $26,000 to make her down payment, and will be able to
finance the remaining eighty percent which amounts to $104,000. Since
the bid from the sale exceeded the debt by $10,000, there is no
deficiency in this situation and these surplus proceeds belong to the
borrower. Allowing the borrower to have the $10,000 at this stage,
however, would be inequitable to the lender and may increase the
lender's exposure. If the high bidder defaults shortly after the sale, the
lender would have to foreclose on the $104,000 mortgage delivered by
the high bidder and would likely face a deficiency since the value of the
property is only $100,000. To the extent the original borrower was
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solvent and would have been able to pay a deficiency, but the high
bidder is not able to pay a deficiency, the lender has been harmed.' 8
However, in this situation the lender would receive the full amount
of the $26,000 down payment. Furthermore, the debt to the lender
would be reduced to $94,000. This is less than the amount of financing
promised to the high bidder, but can easily be handled by having the
lender provide the first $94,000 of financing to the high bidder, secured
by a first lien. The borrower would receive a note for $10,000 from the
high bidder, secured by a second lien on the property. The borrower is
forced to accept a subordinate lien on the property, but the borrower is
free from any deficiency and the high bidder, who has put down $26,000,
has an incentive to service the debts to prevent future foreclosures.
Example Three: Debt less than value, bid less than debt
$100,000
Value of Property:
80,000
Outstanding Debt:
70,000
High Bid:
56,000
Financing Available:
Unlike examples one and two, example three shows equity in the
188. When there is a very large discrepancy between the outstanding indebtedness and
the value of the property, the foreclosing lender that selects this option may face the risk of
a contrived excessive bid price arranged by the borrower and a corporate entity controlled or
influenced by the borrower. For instance, assume an outstanding indebtedness of $3,000,000
secured by property, the value of which has plummeted to $500,000. In the event of a typical
foreclosure that generated a bid price equal to the full value of the property, i.e. $500,000, the
borrower would remain liable for the $2,500,000 deficiency. Collection of this deficiency by
the lender from a solvent borrower would make the lender whole.
However, if the lender elected to foreclose pursuant to a safe harbor foreclosure, the
borrower could fund a new corporate entity that would submit a bid price of $3,000,000.
Submitting a bid price of $3,000,000 would leave the lender with the 20% down payment from
the foreclosure purchaser and a note and lien on the property from the purchaser to make up
the difference. The original borrower has satisfied his obligation in full, and would be relieved
from the potential of a $2,500,000 deficiency. The corporate foreclosure sale purchaser
promptly defaults, and the property purchased, its only asset, is again sold at foreclosure, this
time for its fair market value of $500,000 which the lender applies to the indebtedness.
However, the lender has only received $1,100,000 on its $3,000,000 debt ($600,000 from the
first sale and $500,000 from the second sale), and the remaining deficiency is uncollectible
from the substituted obligor. The original borrower has managed to successfully settle a
$2,500,000 deficiency for $600,000 at the expense of the lender and its selected method of
foreclosure.
An option to avoid this would be to keep the original borrower liable as a guarantor for
that portion of the initial indebtedness that foreclosure sale purchasers are allowed to assume.
That option keeps the original borrower involved and may complicate its ability to get its life
back in order, and was rejected. In addition, the chances of the illustrated occurrence are
remote, and if a lender legitimately suspects that such a possibility may occur, the lender can
easily avoid it merely by electing to foreclose pursuant to the commercially reasonable
standard instead.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:77

property being sold at foreclosure. Situations such as example three, in
which the property sells for an amount significantly below its value
despite the lender's every effort to obtain competitive bidding, prompt
a lender's desire for certainty. The borrower may challenge such sales
and assert that the lender did not conduct the sale in a commercially
reasonable manner, or that the bid price obtained would have been
higher. Of course, the lender could eliminate its liability to the borrower
by demonstrating that the sale was done in a "commercially reasonable
manner." The lender, however, may face the cost and uncertainty of
litigation.
Because the lender in example three elected to foreclose pursuant to
the safe harbor method, the lender is deemed to have foreclosed in a
"commercially reasonable manner." Thus, it is not exposed to the costs
or uncertainty of litigation.
The lender will have to offer the high bidder eighty percent financing,
which amounts to $56,000. Even after applying the $14,000 down
payment, the borrower still owes the lender $10,000, which the lender
can pursue as a deficiency. The borrower has not only lost her equity in
the property, but must pay an additional $10,000 to the lender. The high
bidder has not only been provided with financing, but has purchased a
$100,000 home for $70,000. The goal of obtaining an adequate bid price
has not been realized, and the borrower has suffered a loss of her equity,
while the buyer reaps the benefits. Nonetheless, the sale process itself
is fair and equitable.
Example Four: Debt less than value, bid more than debt.
$100,000
Value of Property:
80,000
Outstanding Debt:
90,000
High Bid:
72,000
Financing Available:
(62,000 from lender)
(10,000 from borrower)
In example four, at least a portion of the equity has been salvaged
for the borrower. However, once again the borrower must accept a
subordinate lien because the foreclosing lender receives all proceeds until
it is paid in full. Consequently, the $18,000 down payment will reduce
the lender's debt to $62,000, which will now be owed by the high bidder
and secured by a first lien on the property purchased. The borrower
would receive a $10,000 note from the high bidder, secured by a second
lien.
If the debt from the high bidder is not paid under this scenario (or
the other scenarios), the liens from the high bidder will be foreclosed.
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In the future foreclosure, the foreclosing lender would continue to have
the option of foreclosing pursuant to the safe harbor method if desired.
In those circumstances, or in circumstances when other junior encumbrances are present, the foreclosing lender must receive payment in full
before the junior lienor receives anything on its note.
For instance, assume that the high bidder in example four defaulted
shortly after the original foreclosure and the first lender once again chose
to foreclose pursuant to the safe harbor method. Assume that at this
next foreclosure, the high bid is $80,000, meaning the bidder at that sale
must produce $16,000 in cash and is entitled to finance the remaining
$64,000. The first lender receives the $16,000 cash and reduces its debt
from $62,000 to $46,000, for which it receives a first lien mortgage. The
borrower/second lienor receives a $10,000 note and second lien to
replace the ones received from the original foreclosure sale purchaser
and the first foreclosure sale purchaser receives a note and third lien in
the amount of $8,000 in exchange for its $18,000 down payment and
other equity in the property. The second safe harbor foreclosure is
shown graphically as follows:
After First Foreclosure

After Second Foreclosure
(bid $80,000)

Lender has $62,000 First
lien

Lender receives 20% down
($16,000) and first lien for
$46,000

Borrower/Second Lienor
has $10,000 Second Lien

Borrower/Second Lienor
has replacement $10,000
Second Lien

First Foreclosure Purchaser
has $18,000 equity

First Foreclosure Purchaser
has $8,000 Third lien.
Second Foreclosure Purchaser owns property

Providing financing will not always assure that bid prices equal the
value of the property sold. By making a known amount of credit
available, however, it will eliminate one of the major impediments to a
competitive bidding model of foreclosure. This boost to the competitive
bidding process comes at little risk to the lender. The foreclosing lender
will always be assured of receiving the twenty percent down payment,
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and will never be required to extend additional credit. Lenders can
choose to foreclose in this manner and maintain the degree of certainty
to which they have been accustomed, without sacrificing the safety they
seek. From the borrower's perspective, competitive bidding can be
expected to generate better bid prices, thereby preserving the borrower's
equity or reducing the deficiency. Prospective bidders, likewise, are
benefitted by the lower cost and certainty of obtaining financing.
Offering this financing will produce a new group of bidders, including
some who may be unable to obtain credit in conventional ways.'89
V.

CONCLUSION

Contemporary models of foreclosure law are problematic. The
paradigmatic approaches characterize foreclosures as a zero-sum game.
To benefit the borrower, one must resign herself to harming the lender.
Such models generate distrust, confrontation, and hostility. Attempts to
referee the perceived power struggle between borrowers and lenders,
such as anti-deficiency legislation, treat the symptom and not the cause.
In the end, the paradigmatic approaches generally fail to provide a
comprehensive model to accommodate the needs of both borrower and
lender. This need not be the case.
The model proposed in this article allays the distrust, fears, and
hostilities present in the foreclosure context. It provides a coherent and
comprehensive approach constructed, in part, on a theoretical scaffolding
resting firmly on traditional notions of debtor-creditor relations and
market forces. Under the proposed model, lenders may select one of
three options upon default by their borrowers. First, a lender may retain
the property in full satisfaction of the debt, but only after proper notice
is given to all parties in interest and no objections are lodged. Essentially, this option mirrors strict foreclosure under present law. Second, a
lender may repossess and sell the property in a commercially reasonable
manner. This option embraces a standard that focuses the parties and
the court's attention on indicia or "badges" of fairness. The focus is
functional; procedures employed and not bid price obtained are
189. The foreclosing lender's selection of the safe-harbor method may, on occasion, be
unsatisfactory to the borrower if the borrower expects the sale to generate his entitled surplus.
The borrower may be unwilling to accept a note and second lien for this surplus and object
to the sale in this method, notwithstanding his belief that the process would generate a higher
bid price. In the event the borrower objects, the lender would observe the other conditions
of the safe harbor method and the sale would be conducted as an all-cash sale. The lender,
nonetheless, would still be afforded the certainty it sought, and the sale, even without the
financing, would be deemed a "commercially reasonable sale."
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scrutinized. In essence, this option marks the confluence of real property
foreclosure law with that of personal property law. The standard-like
approach allows lender and borrower to experiment, to employ new and
different procedures in an attempt to maximize the bid price. In
contrast, the standard contained in the second option, however, infuses
uncertainty in the foreclosure process. The third option speaks directly
to that uncertainty. The third option permits a lender to sell the
property pursuant to a safe-harbor, a rule that provides that a lender is
deemed to have sold the property in a commercially reasonable manner
if it strictly follows certain delineated procedures.
The elegance of the model proposed in this article may be viewed
from all sides of the dispute. Lenders benefit because they are provided
flexibility in selecting any one of three options, and, under options one
and three, certainty in conducting foreclosure proceedings. Borrowers
benefit because the three options are designed to put upward pressure
on the bid price in an effort to approximate the fair market value of the
property. In turn, higher bid prices protect borrower equity, if any, and
reduce any deficiency the borrower may ultimately owe after the
foreclosure sale.
At bottom, the model of foreclosure proposed in this article
recognizes that any foreclosure reform is futile if it is tied to price rather
than to process. Price is effervescent; reality is in the process. And all
concerned benefit from a reasonable, fair, and efficient process.

